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The Disappearing Freedom
of the Press
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West*
Abstract
At this moment of unprecedented decline of local news and
amplified attacks on the American press, scholars are
increasingly turning their attention to the Constitution’s role in
protecting journalism and the journalistic function. Recent calls
by some U.S. Supreme Court Justices to reconsider the core
press-protecting precedent from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
have intensified these conversations. This scholarly dialogue,
however, appears to be taking place against a mistaken
foundational assumption that the U.S. Supreme Court continues
to articulate and embrace at least some notion of freedom of the
press. Yet despite the First Amendment text specifically
referencing it and the Roberts Court’s claims of First Amendment
expansiveness, freedom of the press is quietly disappearing from
the Court’s lexicon.
Our individually coded dataset, capturing every paragraph
mentioning the press written by all 114 Justices in the 235-year
history of the Court, shows that in the last half-century the
Court’s references to the concept of freedom of the press have
dramatically declined. They are now lower than at any other
moment since the incorporation of the First Amendment. The
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University of Georgia School of Law. The authors thank Maria Eliot, Savanna
Nolan, Emily Nuvan, Lydia Owens Rytting, Ken Peterson, Joseph
Scarborough, and Jake Shapiro for their research assistance. They owe a
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jurisprudential desertion of this concept is evident in every
quantitative and qualitative measure we analyzed. Press
freedom was once a commonly adopted frame, with the Court
readily acknowledging it on its own and as a coexisting First
Amendment right alongside the freedom of speech. Indeed,
Justices routinely recognized this right in cases not involving the
press. The data reveal that this practice is a thing of the
past. Gone are not only the ringing, positive endorsements that
situated freedom of the press as valuable, important, or central
to democracy but also the bare acknowledgements of the right at
all. A close investigation of individual Justice’s patterns,
moreover, reveals that there are no true advocates of the right on
the current Court and that most of the current Justices have
rarely, if ever, mentioned it in any context.
This Article addresses both the possible causes and the
troubling consequences of this decline. It explores strong evidence
contradicting many of the initially appealing explanations for
the trend, examining the ways in which the phenomenon is
unlikely to be solely a function of the Court’s decreasing
press-related docket or its reliance on settled law in the area. It
also explores data on the interrelationships between ideology and
acknowledgement of freedom of the press. The disappearance of
the principle of press freedom at the Court may impede the newly
revived effort to invoke the Constitution as a tool for preserving
the flow of information on matters of public concern.
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INTRODUCTION
At this moment of unprecedented decline of local news and
amplified attacks on journalists, it has become clear that the
American news media no longer possesses the social or economic
protection it previously enjoyed. Scholars are thus increasingly
turning their attention to the role of the Constitution as the
ultimate protector of the American free press.1 The problem,
however, is that all of these conversations are built on the
1. See generally, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE
CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF
SPEECH (2021) (arguing that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press may hold meaning in the new media ecosystem as a constitutional
support for more robust funding of public media and other reforms); RonNell
Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Freedom of the Press in Post-Truthism
America, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 419 (2020) (arguing that Press Clause protection
should be informed by unique functions that enhance the marketplace of ideas
for news consumers); [hereinafter Jones & Sun, Post-Truthism America];
Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014).
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seemingly basic—yet untested—assumption that the U.S.
Supreme Court continues to recognize the First Amendment’s
guarantee of the freedom of the press.
This Article explores how the “freedom of the press,” which
was once a regularly referenced concept in Supreme Court
opinions as both an explicitly recognized right and a functional
constitutional tool, is disappearing from the Court’s lexicon.2
The right is disappearing in spite of the First Amendment’s
specific textual guarantee3 and in spite of the Roberts Court’s
embrace of First Amendment expansiveness in other areas.4 In
a pattern that has gone largely unnoticed until now, the Court
today rarely acknowledges the existence of the right to press
freedom.5
This Article identifies, tracks, and analyzes this trend. Our
individually coded dataset, capturing every paragraph
mentioning the press written by all 114 Justices in the 235-year
history of the Court, shows that the Court’s references to the
constitutional right of press freedom have dramatically declined
in the last generation.6 Indeed, they are lower now than at any
moment since the incorporation of the First Amendment.7
The jurisprudential and rhetorical desertion of this right is
evident in every quantitative and qualitative measure we
analyzed. Press freedom was once a commonly adopted
framework, with the Court readily acknowledging it on its own
and as a counterpart to freedom of speech.8 In addition to
regularly mentioning the freedom of the press in cases focused
on the media, the Court also frequently referenced it in cases
not involving the press by including it in general discussions of
recognized and valued constitutional rights.9 Our data,
however, reveal that these practices are a thing of the past.10
2. See infra Part IV.
3. See U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”(emphasis added)).
4. See infra Part V.A.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See infra Part IV.
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The current Court rarely references press freedom and even
more rarely references it in any context that expands the
conceptual scope of the right or advances the real-world
protection of newsgatherers. The ringing, positive endorsements
of freedom of the press that situated it as valuable, important,
or central to our democracy are gone, as are even bare
acknowledgements of the concept at all. A close investigation of
individual Justices’ patterns, moreover, reveals that there are
no true advocates of the right on the current Court and that
most of the current Justices have rarely, if ever, mentioned it in
any context.11 The freedom of the press has simply disappeared
at the Court.
This Article addresses the overpowering evidence of this
decline and explores its possible causes. Specifically, it shows
how the data belie some potential and initially appealing
explanations for this decline, such as suggestions that the trend
is solely a result of shifts in the ideological makeup of the
Court,12 the Court’s smaller press-related docket,13 or a reliance
on settled law in the area.14 This Article also highlights how the
evaporation of this key component of expressive freedom is a
significant deviation from the expansive First Amendment
jurisprudence that is supposedly a hallmark of the Roberts
Court.15 This Court, which in many ways is pushing the
boundaries of First Amendment protection, has quietly erased a
major First Amendment value from the conversation. In light of
this disappearance, the newly revived effort to invoke the
Constitution as a tool for preserving the press function and the
flow of information on matters of public concern may face
additional hurdles.
The Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the
current consequential moment for the American press and the
scholarly groundswell that motivates a study of the Court’s
acknowledgment of press freedom. Part II outlines the
methodology for this study. Part III describes the overall
patterns revealed by data regarding the Court’s recognition of

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.2.
See infra Part V.B.3.
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the right, including the tones Justices use when discussing
freedom of the press and the number of Justices over the course
of history who have referenced the right in their opinions. This
Part also situates these rhetorical patterns within the Court’s
First Amendment case law to paint the first comprehensive
picture of freedom of the press’s jurisprudential role. Part IV
explores in greater depth the precipitous decline in the Court’s
mentions of the freedom of the press. It reveals both the
quantitative frequency data and the compounding qualitative
data that combine to demonstrate the stark disappearance from
the Supreme Court’s working vocabulary of any concept of the
right. Part V examines a set of potential explanations for the
trend and uses additional data gathered in the project to
interrogate them.
I.

A RENEWED FOCUS ON PRESS FREEDOM

Caught inside a perfect storm of economic, cultural,
technological, and political forces, the American free press is at
a breaking point. Without risk of exaggeration, we can say that
our country’s news media landscape is being distorted and
destroyed before our very eyes—a swift and troubling onslaught
that has left scholars and commentators from a number of fields
scrambling to draw attention to the problem and search for
solutions.16 Central to these discussions is a renewed scholarly
focus on the constitutional right of a free press as an enduring
and long-recognized First Amendment value and as a potential
legal tool for safeguarding the press function into the future.
The causes of this crisis of the press and democracy are
varied. An overarching factor, however, is the sharp financial
downturn that has pummeled the news industry over the last
two decades.17 With few exceptions, the once prosperous news
16. See, e.g., The Crisis of the Press and Democracy: Saving the Press
Function, YALE L. SCH. INFO. SOC’Y PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2021),
https://perma.cc/5VMU-PH9J (reporting on an academic conference on the
topic of “Saving the Press Function”); Media Apocalypse, YALE L. SCH. INFO.
SOC’Y PROJECT, https://perma.cc/BGD6-8JTS (highlighting a video series
featuring “discussions with experts about the current crisis roiling journalism
in the United States and what we might do about it”).
17. See PENELOPE MUSE ABERNATHY, NEWS DESERTS AND GHOST
NEWSPAPERS: WILL LOCAL NEWS SURVIVE? 8 (2020), https://perma.cc/WR9P-
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business of the twentieth century is no more.18 By almost every
metric, the business side of journalism has fallen precipitously:
advertising revenues are down,19 subscriptions are down,20
newsrooms are shrinking,21 and newspapers are shuttering.22
The newspapers that have survived are becoming “ghosts” of
their prior selves, whittled to the bone by new owners who are
often private investment firms seeking quick profit through the
consolidation and cannibalization of struggling papers.23 The
arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 only
brought more economic hardship to the industry and
“turbo-charged” its financial downfall.24

EWZX (PDF) (“In only two decades, successive technological and economic
assaults have destroyed the for-profit business model that sustained local
journalism in this country for two centuries. Hundreds of news
organizations—century-old newspapers as well as nascent digital sites—have
vanished.”).
18. See id. at 12.
19. See Newspapers Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 29, 2021),
https://perma.cc/9RSQ-T2Q3 (“The total estimated advertising revenue for the
newspaper industry in 2020 was $9.6 billion . . . . This is down 25% from
2019.”).
20. See Michael Barthel, Estimating U.S. Newspaper Circulation Is a
Challenge—Especially for 2020, PEW RSCH. CTR.: DECODED (June 29, 2021),
https://perma.cc/EEA7-6AAU (asserting that although 2020 marked the best
year for newspapers in decades, “‘best’ does not necessarily mean ‘good.’ If
something falls continuously for decades, at a certain point it finds a floor”).
21. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 8 (“In the 15 years leading up to
2020 . . . half of all local journalists disappeared, as round after round of
layoffs have left many surviving papers . . . mere ‘ghosts,’ or shells of their
former selves.”); Mason Walker, U.S. Newsroom Employment Has Fallen 26%
Since 2008, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/RA4E-3C7M.
22. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 8 (describing the closure of 300
newspapers over a span of two years).
23. See Joe Pompeo, The Hedge Fund Vampire That Bleeds Newspapers
Dry Now Has the Chicago Tribune by the Throat, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://perma.cc/JV44-M9RW (describing Alden Global Capital’s “draconian
playbook” as: “buy distressed newspapers on the cheap, cut the shit out of
them, and reap the profits that can still be made from print advertising”);
ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 87 (“Today, four large firms own 15 percent of
the country’s papers . . . .”).
24. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 8 (stating the fear that the
pandemic may amount to an “‘extinction-level event’ that destroys many of the
survivors and newcomers and leads to the collapse of the country’s local news
ecosystem”).
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Much of the news industry’s commercial troubles
accompanied the rise of the digital age and the concomitant
collapse of the for-profit, advertising-based business model that
long buoyed news organizations.25 As described by Penelope
Muse Abernathy, “[t]he intrusive, always-on internet swiftly
siphoned off readers, advertisers and profits. With Facebook and
Google capturing the vast majority of digital revenue in many
communities today, traditional news organizations, as well as
online outlets, have been reduced to fighting over the digital
scraps.”26 How the news was presented to Americans swiftly
changed as well. Algorithms increasingly dictated what stories
made their way to readers’ eyes,27 while the draw of reliably
popular content like sports and weather became unbundled
from the hard news of public concern, making it harder for the
former to financially support the latter.28
No segment of the press has been harder hit by economic
challenges than local news,29 a phenomenon that has led to the
nationwide rise of “news deserts.”30 According to a report from
the University of North Carolina, since 2005, the country has
lost a quarter of its local newspapers—the entities that “have
historically been the prime source of credible and critical news

25. See id.
26. Id. at 9.
27. See Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and
Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69, 71 (2017) (“[Computer
engineers’] aim is to perfect algorithms to discern exactly what it is that we
want to read and to give us just that, regardless of its objective value or
importance.”).
28. See David Von Drehle, Opinion, What Happens When a Local
Newspaper Dies, WASH. POST (May 8, 2018, 7:46 PM), https://perma.cc/C8SDFA9D (“What newspapers bundled, the Internet has unbundled.”); see also
ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 91 (“Public service journalism—investigative
and analytical reporting on matters of critical importance, such as education,
the environment, politics and the economy—fails to gain traction on the
internet . . . .”).
29. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 8; Tom Sites, About 1,300 U.S.
Communities Have Totally Lost News Coverage, UNC News Desert Study
Finds, POYNTER. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/B4JP-S6KL.
30. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 18 (“[A] news desert [is] ‘a
community, either rural or urban, where residents have very limited access to
the sort of credible and comprehensive news and information that feed
democracy at the grassroots level.’”).
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and information in most small and mid-sized communities.”31
The loss of local newspapers has raised particular concerns
among press scholars and commentators because “[i]t is through
local journalism that communities stay connected to and
informed about what is happening in their backyards , especially
in their schools, their governments, and other critical
institutions and infrastructures.”32
Meanwhile, the press has faced an onslaught of
attacks—unparalleled in modern times—that have been led and
cheered on by political actors.33 The new moment of heightened
scholarly concern about press freedom emerged in part as a
result of Donald J. Trump’s turbulent presidency, during which
time the press was subjected to extraordinary attacks from the
highest levels of government.34 Branded as “fake news” and
“enemies of the people,”35 the press faced an unprecedented
effort to discredit its work and its standing within the nation’s
democratic framework, exacerbating an already deep partisan

31. Id. at 89.
32. VICTOR PICKARD, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT JOURNALISM? CONFRONTING
THE MISINFORMATION SOCIETY 102 (2020).
33. See, e.g., David Smith, ‘That’s a Nasty, Snarky Question’: Trump’s
Media Assault Rages on in Midst of Coronavirus Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Apr.
1, 2020), https://perma.cc/T8YL-EQZZ; Jay Rosen, America’s Press and the
Asymmetric War for Truth, THE N.Y. REV. (Nov. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/6QGU-V9JQ (“To be its dwindling self, the GOP has to also
be at war with the press, unless of course the press folds under pressure.”).
34. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction
and the Press, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301, 1308 (2017) (“Trump's relationship with
the press seems unquestionably calculated to construct the press as an
enemy.”).
35. Id. at 1304 (quoting a since-deleted tweet by Trump from February
2017 which stated: “The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews,
@ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy of the American People.
SICK!”).
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divide over press trustworthiness36 and causing the United
States’ international press freedom ranking to plummet.37
Trump’s rhetoric included comments celebrating the use of
force by police against journalists covering protests,38 and
scholars and advocacy groups have noted that threats and
violent attacks against reporters have skyrocketed.39
Journalists are increasingly at risk of verbal and physical
assaults from law enforcement officers40 and members of the
36. See Megan Brenan, Americans Remain Distrustful of Mass Media,
GALLUP (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/5TC9-JQT7 (“The political
polarization that grips the country is reflected in partisans’ views of the media,
which are now the most divergent in Gallup’s history.”); Jeffrey Gottfried et
al., Trusting the News Media in the Trump Era, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 12,
2019), https://perma.cc/J3F7-C5MK (“On item after item, Republicans
consistently express far greater skepticism of the news media and their
motives than Democrats . . . .”). See also Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake
“Fake News”, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 232, 261 (2017)
Forty-four percent—almost half—of Americans (and 74% of
Republicans) believe that the news media fabricate stories about
Trump. A substantial minority—31%—in a recent survey indicate
agreement with Trump’s tweet that the media are the “enemy” and
“keep political leaders from doing their jobs.” The survey also shows
that “one in four Americans (25%) endorses draconian limitations
on press freedom.” (citations omitted).
37. See Sasha Ingber, The U.S. Now Ranks as a ‘Problematic’ Place for
Journalists, NPR (Apr. 18, 2019, 5:13 PM), perma.cc/86BH-TMWS (noting
that Reporters Without Borders downgraded the United States to a
“problematic” place for journalists and ranked the U.S. 48 out of 180 on the
organization’s annual World Press Freedom Index).
38. See Brett Samuels, Trump Mocks Reporters Who Were Roughed up by
Police During Protests, THE HILL (Sept. 22, 2020, 9:07 PM),
https://perma.cc/RMW7-CEJE (quoting President Trump as saying that police
using force against reporters is “actually a beautiful sight”).
39. See Erin C. Carroll, Obstruction of Journalism, 99 DENV. L. REV. 407,
409 (2022) (“Physical assaults against journalists in the United States
increased nearly 1,400% in 2020.” (citation omitted)); see also Kirstin
McCudden, Celebrating 5 Years Since Launch of the U.S. Press Freedom
Tracker, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER, https://perma.cc/7B7Y-CRUE (“More
journalists were assaulted in the one week [in 2020] immediately following the
death of George Floyd . . . than 2017–2019, combined.”).
40. See, e.g., Pulitzer Prize-Winning Photojournalist Shoved to the
Ground by LAPD, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (May 31, 2020),
https://perma.cc/35P2-39JP; Marc Tracy & Rachel Abrams, Police Target
Journalists as Trump Blames ‘Lamestream Media’ for Protests, N.Y. TIMES
(June 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/47Z3-MKXE (last updated Mar. 10, 2021);
Katie Shepherd, This Portland Journalist Has Been Gassed and Shoved by
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public.41 They are being arrested,42 charged,43 and tried44 for
crimes. They are being harassed,45 threatened,46 and even
killed.47
It is against this backdrop that press scholars,
commentators, and advocates have come together in a renewed
effort to preserve the press function in America.48 Drawing
Federal Officers. She’s Only 17., WASH. POST (July 23, 2020, 6:32 AM),
https://perma.cc/AV5E-JEGZ; Courtney Douglas, Amid Black Lives Matter
Protests, a Crushing Moment for Journalists Facing Record Attacks, Arrests at
the Hands of Law Enforcement, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Sept.
4, 2020), https://perma.cc/YPC7-9N3H (“The Press Freedom Tracker has
documented 185 attacks on the media in 2020, up from 40 in 2019, 42 in 2018
and 50 in 2017, respectively.”); Clare Duffy, Journalist Partially Blinded While
Covering Protests: There's No Way They Could Have Mistaken Me for Anything
but Press, CNN BUS., https://perma.cc/FN5W-2VT7 (last updated June 14,
2020, 5:19 PM).
41. See, e.g., AP Photojournalist Assaulted by Bystander During Event in
Philadelphia, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER
(June
4,
2020),
https://perma.cc/942C-FP3H; Reporter Assaulted Live on Air at Phoenix
Protest, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (May 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/37UDLJES; Trump Supporter Assaults, Knocks Phone Out of Journalist’s Hands,
U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (Sept. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/N6PW-QNFU
(last updated May 28, 2021); Broadcast Journalist Stabbed with Scissors
While Reporting in Boston, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://perma.cc/W448-ULVQ; Reporter Hit With Wooden Board at New York’s
Occupy City Hall Protest, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (July 12, 2020),
https://perma.cc/2H36-ECNN.
42. See Arrest/Criminal Charge, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER,
https://perma.cc/PZZ4-CG4J.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., William Morris, ‘The Jury Made the Right Decision’: Reporter
Andrea Sahouri Acquitted in Trial Stemming From Arrest as She Covered
Protest, DES MOINES REG. (Mar. 10, 2021, 1:32 PM), https://perma.cc/64MX3MKR (last updated Mar. 11, 2021, 8:54 AM).
45. See, e.g., Journalists Face Harassment While Covering Coronavirus,
U.S. PRESS FREEDOM TRACKER (May 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/9UZ5-RBUH.
46. See, e.g., Katherine Jacobsen & Lucy Westcott, ‘Three People
Threatened to Shoot Me.’ Journalists Describe Covering Mob Violence at the
US Capitol, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jan. 7, 2021, 7:15 PM),
https://perma.cc/WU86-3MCJ.
47. See, e.g., ‘Dagger at the Heart of Free Press’: The Killing of a Las Vegas
Journalist, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2022, 1:00 PM), https://perma.cc/24WS8VXR.
48. See ABERNATHY, supra note 17, at 88 (quoting a representative of PEN
America, a nonprofit organization that advocates for press freedom, as stating
that “[t]hings are so bad, we need an all-of-the-above approach”).
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attention to what they fear is a growing crisis, academics from
a number of fields have launched a burgeoning scholarly
movement aimed at safeguarding the continuation of
newsgathering and accurate information-sharing in America,
and exploring how the First Amendment’s guarantee of press
freedom might be a tool in those efforts.49
To this end, scholars are closely questioning the
longstanding components of the U.S. press freedom structure50
and re-exploring the underpinnings of press freedom values in
areas where courts have long tussled with the principle, such as
reporter’s privilege51 and national security.52 These scholars,
however, are also grappling with complex questions about the
roles the press and press freedom play in new media and legal
landscapes. They are exploring the relationships between the
American free press and changing media structures, political
polarization, and the decline of reliable news, as well as
interrogating the boundaries of press freedom in the face of
propaganda threats53 and the influence of social media
companies’ incentives.54 They are further investigating how
organizational operational models55 and monopolistic
49. See id.
50. See RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The Fragility of the
Free American Press, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 572–76 (2017).
51. See generally, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s
Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1221 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court’s
investigation of the unique freedom of the press reasons for protecting
journalists’ ability to preserve source confidentiality).
52. See generally, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser & David Schulz, A House Built on
Sand: The Constitutional Infirmity of Espionage Act Prosecutions for Leaking
to the Press, 19 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 153 (2021).
53. See YOCHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION,
DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 75–82 (2018)
(arguing that a feedback loop in American conservative media has radicalized
the rightwing ecosystem and rendered it susceptible to both foreign and
domestic propaganda efforts).
54. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK
DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 8 (2018) (“As reputable news
organizations lay off reporters and pay less for freelance work, they have
altered their editorial decisions and strategies to pander to the biases inherent
in Facebook’s algorithms.”).
55. See Emily Bell & Taylor Owen, The Platform Press: How Silicon
Valley Reengineered Journalism, TOW CTR. FOR DIGIT. JOURNALISM (Mar. 29,
2017), https://perma.cc/B7ST-HHZH (describing the evolution of companies
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concentrations of power56 have an impact on free-press values in
this ecosystem. Most importantly, they are thinking creatively
about the relationship between constitutional values of press
freedom and the needs of a vibrant democracy, including
suggesting proposals for adopting new models of public media,57
structural reforms designed to preserve core press functions,58
and policies that would make a free press more reflective of the
needs of the wider citizenry.59
Some of this scholarship actively urges the courts to put the
constitutional right to press freedom to new analytical use.60 For
example, in her recent work, former dean of Harvard Law School
Martha Minow invokes the First Amendment’s Press Clause in
support of a wide array of reforms meant to protect the flow of
information on matters of public concern in the new media
landscape.61 In her new book, Saving the News: Why the
like Google and Facebook beyond a distribution role and the complex question
of private platform control over what audiences and what type of journalism
occurs).
56. See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 976 (2019) (“A handful of digital platforms exert
increasing control over key arteries of American commerce and
communications. Structuring access to markets, these firms function as
gatekeepers for billions of dollars in economic activity.”).
57. See, e.g., PICKARD, supra note 32, at 5, 10 (2020) (arguing that
“[u]nless we first address the . . . commercialism that lies at the center of the
system’s maladies . . . we cannot overcome the other harms plaguing American
news media” and that “[t]he best hope for public service journalism is a public
media option”).
58.
See, e.g., Steve Waldman, Curing Local News for Good, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/M5BZ-CGPP (detailing
governmental actions that might spur structural relief to sustain
newsgathering, including IRS decisions regarding newspapers’ nonprofit
status, reforms to bankruptcy and pension law, direct aid to journalists, and
government spending on advertising in support of local news).
59. See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Fiona Morgan, Poor Information: How
Economics Affects the Information Lives of Low-Income Individuals, 12 INT’L
J. COMMC’N 2832, 2843 (2018).
60. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Changing Ecosystem of News and
Challenges for Freedom of the Press, 64 LOY. L. REV. 499, 539 (2018) (“To
sustain freedom of the press and enable the people, courts need to pursue some
new approaches, and so does Congress.”).
61See id. at 543 (“What is needed is not a preferred constitutional status for
professional journalists, but a constitutionally inflected strategy for reaching
news deserts and enabling competing groups to have the materials necessary
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Constitution Calls for Government Action to Preserve Freedom of
Speech, Minow argues that some government regulations—such
as proposals to decrease concentration of platform ownership, to
build a new “fairness doctrine,” or to support news initiatives
with robust public funding—are not merely good policies but
affirmative constitutional necessities for fulfilling the wider
purpose of the First Amendment in a modern media
ecosystem.62 She further asserts that press advocates can
effectively counter any potential legal challenges to the
regulation of private speech platforms by relying on the weight
of First Amendment press freedom values.63 Minow’s
arguments, like those of other scholars at this intense moment
of press-freedom focus, invite an investigation of the role of the
freedom of the press in our wider constitutional system.
Indeed, other scholarship, including our own, has urged an
even more aggressive invigoration of the Press Clause as an
affirmative protection for newsgathering;64 the enhancement of
government accountability;65 and the performance of functions
that overcome the limitations of individual press consumers,
like information-processing and truth-seeking, in the

to check alleged facts; see who is paying for what ads and stories; and
distinguish vetted and unvetted [materials].”).
62. MARTHA MINOW, SAVING THE NEWS: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CALLS FOR
GOVERNMENT ACTION TO PRESERVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 146–48 (2021) (arguing
that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press may hold
meaning in the new media ecosystem as a constitutional support for more
robust funding of public media and other reforms).
63. See id.
64. See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1025, 1068 (2011) (advancing a proposal to embrace press exceptionalism
through a narrow definition of “the press” that reduces overlap between press
and speech, thereby granting the Press Clause independent significance); see
also Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 91, 102 (2018)
(pushing back on arguments suggesting “that the Press Clause functions as a
nondiscrimination provision that prohibits speaker-based classifications by
the government” in favor of the press).
65. See Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434,
2437 (2014) (arguing for a classification of “press speakers” who can uniquely
invoke Press Clause protection because they fulfill specific roles related to
informing the public of newsworthy matters and providing a check on the
government and the powerful).
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marketplace of ideas.66 The theoretical approaches proposed in
these scholarly conversations are making their way into
concrete arguments before the courts, which are being asked to
consider the scope and contours of constitutional press freedom
protections in new ways.67
These inquiries plumb the depths of what the constitutional
right of freedom of the press means, how it operates, and who it
protects. But all of these arguments share a single baseline: they
assume the universal legal recognition of some foundational
principle of a constitutional right of press freedom. If that
baseline does not exist—if the Court is in the process of erasing
the First Amendment right to press freedom altogether—then
the conversations in this space face yet another hurdle. The
scholarly movement to make something more of the
constitutional freedom of the press presupposes a Court that is,
at a minimum, amenable to the bare concept of a constitutional
freedom of the press.
II.

METHODOLOGY

The findings reported here were gathered in a large-scale
project designed to code every reference of the press in all

66. See Jones & Sun, Post-Truthism America, supra note 1, at 425
(asserting that there is a need for protection of the press as a
market-enhancing institution and exploring the market-enhancing functions
that should qualify an institutional actor as “the press” under the Press
Clause); see also RonNell Andersen Jones, Press Speakers and the First
Amendment Rights of Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 499, 537 (2019) (arguing
that press speakers engage in special institutional First Amendment activities
on behalf of audiences and perform a vital proxy role for listeners whose direct
access interests are fulfilled through the protected activities of their press
partners).
67. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae Thirteen Scholars and Practitioners
of First Amendment Law in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 28, Index
Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2020) (No.
20-35739), 2020 WL 7063163, at *28 (asserting that the district court’s
injunction should be affirmed as a proper enforcement of the rights protected
by the Press Clause because journalists were engaged in activity that was
intended to be protected by the Clause).
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opinions68 by Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court since 1784.69
The project explored 8,792 total characterizations of the press in
the writings of 114 Justices over the course of 235 years.70
The dataset includes every paragraph in which a Justice of
the Court spoke in any way about the press or the press
function. Decisions on inclusion were shaped by the Court’s own
identifications of those functions over time, such as its use of a
wide set of synonyms for those concepts, and the data include
references to both traditional legacy media and other performers
of the press function.71 Coders read each of these 5,267
paragraphs and logged positive, negative, and neutral tonal
variations within eight common press-related frames.72 Seven of
the eight frames tracked by our coders are sweepingly
topical—capturing, for example, all mentions of interactions
between the press and the justice system or all narratives
involving possible regulation of the press.73 But one frame

68. The Westlaw “OPINION” database that was used to create the
dataset captures all majority, dissenting, and concurring opinions, as well as
all other written materials from individual Justices that were published in the
U.S. Reports, including dissents from denial of certiorari and statements
associated with recusal decisions and stay applications. The specific search
syntax used (without the leading and ending quotation marks) was as follows:
“adv: OPINION(#press or media or newspaper or “fourth estate” or journalis!
or reporter or newspaperman or newsman or pressman or (news /2 (gather! or
magazine or outlet or organization or service or coverage or article or story or
cycle or broadcast!)))”.
69. The studied period ran from 1784 through July 2020, when the Court
completed its 2019 Term. The first reference to the press found in this studied
period occurred in 1821. See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 232 (1821)
(referencing “the liberty of speech and of the press”). The first reference to the
concept of freedom of the press was that same Term. See id.
70. For an extended discussion of the wider project methodology, see
RonNell Andersen Jones & Sonja R. West, The U.S. Supreme Court’s
Characterizations of the Press: An Empirical Study, 100 N.C. L. REV. 375,
386–90 (2022) [hereinafter Jones & West, Empirical Study].
71. For example, the dataset includes modern paragraphs that do not
involve traditional press outlets but speak of the performance of the
newsgathering function by other actors. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.
1715, 1740 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (referencing the possibility of a
“citizen journalist” recording police with a cellphone camera and streaming
the footage on social media).
72. Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 387–88.
73. See id.
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focuses on a linguistically and conceptually precise legal
concept: the constitutional right of press freedom.74 This Article
focuses on the data captured by this frame—the “Right Frame.”
Coders recorded the Right Frame every time a Justice of the
Court mentioned the concept of a free press or freedom of the
press in any way. The most common formulations of this across
the dataset are direct references to the right of “freedom of the
press”75 or verbatim quotes of the First Amendment’s phrasing,
“freedom of speech, or of the press.”76 But individual
human-coder review ensured the inclusion of a fuller set of
theoretical and conceptual synonyms referencing the existence
of a freedom of the press.77 Of the more than 5,000 paragraphs
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733–35 (1877); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277, 298, 368 (1901); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S.
325, 332 (1920); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931); Milk
Wagon Drivers Union of Chi., Loc. 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287, 299 (1941); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 381 (1951) (Black, J.,
concurring); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 384 (1962); Byrne v. Karalexis,
396 U.S. 976, 980 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 100–01 (1979); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 223, 230 (1987); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334,
360–67 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of
N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 154, 161–62 (2002).
76. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857); United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289, 292 (1904); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 474 (1920); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364
(1937); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 479, 488, 492 (1957); A Book
Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 427 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring); Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1973); Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 366, 381, 384 (1984);
Denver Area Educ. Telcomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996);
Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320 (2002); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 420 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
77. See, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 131 (1895) (“[L]iberty of
the press . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 282 (1901) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press . . . .” (emphasis added));
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 409 (1921) (“[F]ree press . . . .”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
664 (1925) (“[L]iberty of speech and of the press . . . .”); Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (“[T]he press has exerted a freedom . . . .”);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“[P]reserve an
untrammeled press . . . .”).
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discussing the press or press functions, 1,192 included at least
one reference to the freedom of the press.
Each instance of usage was further coded for tone.78 Coders
recorded a reference as neutral if it suggested that a free press
or a constitutional liberty of the press exists but did not include
any accompanying commentary characterizing the right. Any
mention, for example, simply to “the freedom of the press,” “the
liberty of the press,” or “a free press” was coded as neutral. If,
however, a reference used language indicating that the right or
liberty is not valuable, then coders logged it as negative.
Likewise, coders flagged as positive any reference suggesting
that press freedom is important or valuable. Thus, any reference
to “press freedom,” “free press,” or “liberty of the press” that
included a modifier like “vital,” “significant,” “crucial,”
“important,” “central,” “core,” or “essential” received this coding.
Post-coding analysis merged all coded paragraphs with the
Supreme Court Database,79 making it possible to parse the
results by Court Term, by authoring Justice, and by case topic
area. Eight hundred and sixty-seven of the 1,192 paragraphs
referencing freedom of the press (72.73%) appear in cases
reaching First Amendment holdings; the remainder are in cases
focused on a variety of other legal matters.80
III. JUSTICES’ DEPICTIONS OF PRESS FREEDOM
In contrast to the broader set of press references we
considered in our larger study,81 the constitutional right
framework focuses specifically on the Justices’ mentions of press
freedom as a First Amendment liberty. Separately tracking
these references allows us to explore important questions of
when and how members of the Court have reinforced or
amplified the constitutional status of the American free press.
In our examination of this data, we find that throughout the
78. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
79. The Supreme Court Database, WASH. UNIV. L. SCH.,
https://perma.cc/VS42-5QSF.
80. For example, 8.31% of the references (99 paragraphs) were in cases
coded by the Supreme Court Database as criminal procedure cases; 7.63% (91
paragraphs) were in cases coded as economic activity cases; 3.02% (36
paragraphs) were in cases coded as union cases; and 2.77% (33 paragraphs)
were in cases coded as civil rights cases.
81. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 390.
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Court’s history the constitutional right framework has been a
key mechanism employed by the Justices to signal the continued
value of press freedom and the press function.
A.

Unique Framework Reflecting Press Freedom’s
Constitutional Status

Our data show that discussing the role of the press as part
of our constitutional system is one of the most frequently used,
and therefore arguably the most important, of the
press-characterizing contexts we studied. It is the third most
common framework the Justices have turned to when
mentioning the press.82 The contexts in which these references
occur vary widely over the dataset. Sometimes, press freedom or
a “free press” is included in a broader list of constitutional rights
or values;83 in other instances, it is discussed alone without any
reference to other constitutionally protected freedoms.84 In some
82. The only frames that were more common in the full dataset were basic
depictions of the press in its role as a communicator of information and
discussions of the appropriateness of government regulation of it.
83. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942)
(“[F]reedom of speech, press and religion.”); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 145 (1943) (“[F]ree speech, free press and free assemblage . . . .”);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 107 (1943) (“[F]reedom of speech,
press, and religion guaranteed by the First Amendment.”); Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 89 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he freedom of speech and
of the press guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .” (quoting Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940))); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373
(1947) (“[T]he unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve[s] as [a]
constant reminder[ ] that freedom of speech and of the press should not be
impaired . . . .”); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press are essential to the
enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield power.”);
Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 101 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed
by the Constitution . . . .”); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)
(“[T]he freedom of speech and that of the press . . . .”); De Jonge, 299 U.S. at
364 (“[F]reedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights . . . .”);
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 664 (“[T]he liberty of speech and of the press . . . .”); ex rel.
Turner, 194 U.S. at 294 (“[T]he vital importance of freedom of speech and of
the press . . . .”).
84. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 205 (1985) (“The liberty of the
press . . . .” (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938))); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (“[T]he constitutional right of a free
press.”); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
145 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[A] free press is indispensable to a free
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instances, this framing was the only characterization of the
press in the specified paragraphs;85 in others, it was used
alongside other common press frames.86
Beyond mere frequency, the Justices’ use of the
constitutional right framework also stands out for its unique
tonal delivery. By design, every category in our study was
assigned a context in which it would be coded as positive,
negative, or neutral.87 For most frames, however, their common
usage tilts heavily toward one tone or another, with some
carrying a predominantly negative tone and others a primarily
positive one.88
The first notable tonal characteristic found in the
press-freedom frame is that the Justices’ mentions of the press
have always been either positive or neutral in tone. No member
of the Court has ever referenced the right of press freedom with
a negative tone—a finding that cannot be said for any other
frame that we studied, including other frames that skewed
heavily positive.89
society.”); Craig, 331 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he freedom
of the press so indispensable to our democratic society . . . .”); Id. at 383
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“A free press lies at the heart of our democracy and
its preservation is essential to the survival of liberty.”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 401 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he clearly expressed purpose
of the Founders to guarantee the press a favored spot in our free society.”);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 355 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(“A free press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives it
power.”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (“[T]he
fundamental doctrine of freedom of the press.”).
85. In 287 of the 1,192 paragraphs containing reference to press
freedom—24% of the total references—the Court was referring to the press
only through a reference to freedom of the press.
86. In 526 paragraphs, 44.97% of the total, press freedom was referenced
alongside commentary that fell within one of our other codable frames, like the
historical value of the press, the impact of the press on individuals, the
propriety of regulating the press, or the trustworthiness of the press. In 221
paragraphs, 18.54% of the total, it was referenced alongside two or more of
these frames. In 12.42% of paragraphs, it was alongside more than two
additional frames.
87. Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 390 n.65.
88. See id. at 396–401.
89. For example, our “History” frame, which captured every reference the
Justices made to the press through the eyes of the Founders, was nearly
always used with a positive tone, but the dataset includes at least a few
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While the constitutional right context was mostly a
neutrally applied framework, a significant number of the
Justices’ references—over 20%—were positive. As discussed
earlier, this means that their reference to the right of press
freedom included an explicitly positive modifier. In some of
these positive statements, the Justices discussed freedom of the
press as a standalone constitutional right, referring to it as
“vital,”90 “indispensable,”91 “essential,”92 “fundamental,”93
“important,”94 or “cherished.”95
Often, though, the Justices mentioned press freedom not in
a standalone way but in tandem with discussions of other
constitutional rights. Justice John Harlan II, for example,
referred to the “indispensable liberties” of “speech, press, or
association.”96 Justice Wiley Rutledge likewise emphasized that
“the First Amendment guaranties of the freedoms of speech,
press, assembly and religion occupy preferred position not only
in the Bill of Rights, but also in the repeated decisions of this

references by Justices that are using the framework to depict the press
negatively. See id. at 398–99.
90. Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 355 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“A free
press is vital to a democratic society because its freedom gives it power.”).
91. Craig, 331 U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“It cannot be
repeated too often that the freedom of the press so indispensable to our
democratic society presupposes an independent judiciary which will, when
occasion demands, protect that freedom.”); Columbia Broad., 412 U.S. at 145
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“Those who wrote our First Amendment put their
faith in the proposition that a free press is indispensable to a free society.”).
92. Craig, 331 U.S. at 383 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“A free press lies at
the heart of our democracy and its preservation is essential to the survival of
liberty.”); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 205 (noting the “liberty of the press” and “the vital
importance of protecting this essential liberty” (citation omitted)).
93. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 280 (containing Justice Sutherland’s
reference to “the fundamental doctrine of freedom of the press”).
94. Opelika, 316 U.S. at 621 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“Important as free
speech and a free press are to a free government and a free citizenry, there is
a right even more dear to many individuals—the right to worship their
Maker . . . .”).
95. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 840 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The only issue here is whether the complete ban on interviews with inmates
selected by the press goes beyond what is necessary for the protection of these
interests and infringes upon our cherished right of a free press.”).
96. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
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Court.”97 In a separate review of these paragraphs, we observed
that this practice—of the Justices including press freedom as
one of a select group of important constitutional rights—was a
significant pattern.
While press freedom appears in the Court’s opinions
alongside a variety of other constitutional rights, we also noted
during our post-coding review that one of its persistent
“traveling companions” was the freedom of speech. The Justices
often linked the two rights and emphasized their centrality to
free people in a democracy.98 In one illustrative example, Justice
Anthony Kennedy declared that “the freedom of speech and that
of the press . . . reflect[] the belief of the framers of the
Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of
free government by free men.”99
The constitutional right framework is also unique because
of the inherent significance that is conveyed by even the Court’s
most ordinary uses of it. Our data show that this framework is
a predominantly neutral construct, with almost 80% of the
Justices’ mentions of the press in the constitutional right
context occurring without any additional positive description.100
The Justices, for example, frequently take note of the simple
inclusion of press freedom in the Constitution—not uncommonly
as part of a straightforward recitation of the First Amendment’s
text.101
Such references are technically “neutral” statements,
because the Justices did not include any additional linguistic
layer indicating a positive or negative tone.102 But the housing
of press references within the constitutional right framework
carries, in and of itself, a distinctive weight as compared to the
Court’s other press mentions, because all constitutional rights
are, by definition, legally special.

97. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 106 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
98. See, e.g., supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
99. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 782–83 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939)).
100. See infra Figure 1.
101. See, e.g., McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The First Amendment provides that ‘Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’” (citation omitted)).
102. See supra Part II.
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While there may be ongoing debates about the precise
meaning and contours of the First Amendment right to press
freedom, there is no dispute about its heightened status as
compared to the spectrum of human activities and interests that
the Court has not recognized as constitutionally protected. The
Court, for example, does not talk of a “right” to eat, have a job,
or receive healthcare despite the importance of these activities
to individuals. It does not discuss the collective work of teachers,
scientists, or farmers as a categorical constitutional “freedom”
despite the significance of their occupations to our communities.
Indeed, the Court has explicitly rejected claims to a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide,103 access to
education,104 protection from private violence,105 or the testing
of DNA evidence by criminal defendants.106 In the eyes of a
subset of legal thinkers, moreover, any right that is grounded in
explicit constitutional text—like press freedom—stands on more
legitimate constitutional ground than the rights that are
“unenumerated.”107 Additionally, any time the Justices note
103. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (holding that
a ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
104. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54–55
(1973) (holding that funding disparities in public schools do not violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
105. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
197 (1989) (“[W]e conclude that a State’s failure to protect an individual
against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause.”).
106. See Dist. Att’y’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
73 (2009) (“Establishing a freestanding right to access DNA evidence for
testing would force us to act as policymakers . . . .”).
107. See, e.g., Don Franzen, Reading the Text: An Interview with Justice
Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court, L.A. REV. OF BOOKS (Oct. 1, 2012),
https://perma.cc/2SP7-W5B2
[I]f you believe it is a compendium of all unenumerated rights, you
have to believe that the framers were nuts. I mean, did they go
through the trouble of listing in detail, you know, the right to trial
by jury in all matters of common law involving more than 20 dollars,
no quartering of troops in homes, or one after another, and finally
when you go, “yes, what should we add? Everything else.” That’s
not the way you write a legal document. And this was a legal
document. Just as the Tenth Amendment is nothing but an
expression of the belief in federalism, so also the Ninth Amendment
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press freedom’s incorporation as a “liberty” under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, they are
implicitly conveying its place among the rights the Court has
deemed to be “fundamental.”108
Therefore, every time the Court places its references to the
press or the press function in the constitutional right
framework—with or without additional positive semantics—it
is, at a minimum, acknowledging and reinforcing the press
function’s intrinsically heightened legal position. The effect of
the Court noting its constitutional status is cumulative, as each
additional recognition of the First Amendment’s protection of
press freedom contributes to the strengthening of that position.
As Frederick Schauer has explained, in the law, “the status of a
source as an authority is the product of an informal, evolving,
and scalar process by which some sources become progressively
more and more authoritative as they are increasingly used and
accepted.”109
If a constitutional right’s relevancy is continually reinforced
through the Court’s (even neutral) acknowledgements of its
existence, the opposite phenomenon must also be true: a
constitutional right’s power may decline, not only through
explicitly negative references to it, but rather through the
Court’s seeming indifference. A legal principle “that is utterly
ignored cannot be said to be influential or authoritative.”110
B.

The Constitutional Right Framework’s Heightened
Importance for Press Freedom

This truism—that a legal right can grow, morph, or weaken
through the Court’s repeated acknowledgement of it or,
conversely, through judicial abandonment—is particularly
is nothing but an expression of belief in the natural law. But it is
not an invitation to the judges to apply whatever they think the
natural law says. (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia).
108. See John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293,
1299 (1993) (“The breadth of the interests and principles evoked by the term
‘liberty’ extends far beyond the area of political debate . . . to encompass the
kinds of expressive conduct that now enjoys First Amendment immunity.”).
109. Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931,
1956–57 (2008).
110. Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 347
(2007).
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salient for the constitutional right of press freedom. Over the
last half century, the Court has treated freedom of the press as
a unique constitutional ingredient—a principle that adds
support to the overall strength of expressive freedoms more
generally. Press freedom’s constitutional potency in this
supporting role, moreover, relies heavily on the Court’s
rhetorical signaling of its continued importance.
The Court’s attention to the constitutional protection of the
press has gone through a variety of stages throughout the
Court’s history. But the key before-and-after dividing line can
be drawn at the Court’s incorporation of press freedom into the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in 1931. Before
the end of World War I, the Court paid little attention to press
freedom, just as they took little notice of any of the First
Amendment’s expressive liberties.111 That all changed, however,
in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson112 when the Court
incorporated the protections of the Press Clause to apply to the
states and for the first time held that a government regulation
violated the Constitution’s guarantee of the freedom of the
press.113
The Court’s incorporation of the Press Clause solidified
press freedom’s constitutional standing as a fundamental right
of widespread importance. Consistent with this common
understanding of the trajectory of the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence, our data show the Justices’ references to the
constitutional right of press freedom spiking in frequency
starting in the 1930s.114

111.

See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951)
No important case involving free speech was decided by this Court
prior to Schenck v. United States, [249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).] Indeed,
the summary treatment accorded an argument based upon an
individual's claim that the First Amendment protected certain
utterances indicates that the Court at earlier dates placed no
unique emphasis upon that right. It was not until the classic dictum
of Justice Holmes in the Schenck case that speech per se received
that emphasis in a majority opinion. (citations omitted).
112. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
113. See id. at 722–23.
114. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1

While references to press freedom rose significantly
post-incorporation, scholars have noted differences in how the
Justices interacted with the right over time.115 In the initial
period from the 1930s to the 1960s, the Justices substantively
engaged with the First Amendment’s Press Clause.116 During
this era, as David A. Anderson has explained, “the Court
invoked the Press Clause in many cases and appeared to rely on
it, rather than the Speech Clause, to protect freedom of the
press.”117
Over time, however, the concept of the constitutional right
to a free press seemed to take on a new role as a backup
expressive freedom—one less likely to be seen as the repository
115. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV.
429, 446–51 (2002).
116. See id. at 448 (referring to this period as “the heyday of the Press
Clause in the Supreme Court.”).
117. Id. (citation omitted).
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of substantive rights and protections and more likely to be
employed as a rhetorical or analytical tool in support of a
broader First Amendment holding.118 During this stage,
spanning from the 1960s through the early 1990s, the Justices’
interpretation of the freedom of speech was growing in power
and reach.119 Meanwhile, their depiction of press freedom was
transforming from a constitutional power independent from, or
coequal to, freedom of speech into a still significant, but less
distinct, component of what the Justices began increasingly to
refer to as the “freedom of expression.”120
During this time, the First Amendment right to a free press
thus assumed the constitutional character of an often necessary
but not sufficient element that meaningfully informed the shape
and breadth of expressive freedom. The Justices in these years
frequently discussed, lauded, and emphasized press freedom,
while at the same time rarely relying on it as the constitutional
home of explicit substantive rights.121 While the Court’s
ultimate holdings in these cases may have been formally
grounded in the Speech Clause, the analyses required to reach
those holdings often hinged on the Justices’ underlying
recognition of the Constitution’s protection for the press.122 The
Justices, for example, frequently sandwiched their Speech
Clause holdings between soaring statements about the value of
a constitutionally protected free press.123 Alternatively, they
analyzed cases through the real-world effects of their decisions
on press liberties and the practical value of press functions
before announcing a right stemming ostensibly from the

118. See id. at 449–50.
119. See Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then and Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49,
100 (2016).
120. Id.
121. See RonNell Andersen Jones, The Dangers of Press Clause Dicta, 48
GA. L. REV. 705, 715 (2014) (“[T]hese characterizations of the media, its role,
and its unique societal contributions are made when the question of press
freedom is not squarely before the Court, and the depictions are presented in
passing, unconnected to a holding and unmoored in constitutional
jurisprudence.”).
122. See Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 749
(2014).
123. See Jones, supra note 121, at 711.
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freedom of speech.124 Indeed, despite the decline in substantive
Press Clause holdings, it is during this period that the Court
handed down a large number of its most well-known decisions
recognizing and protecting the press function.125
Take, as an example, the Court’s 1976 decision in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart.126 While the legal challenge was
brought by a news organization, this case considered a trial
judge’s order that prohibited “everyone in attendance” at a
criminal pretrial hearing from publicly disseminating
potentially prejudicial evidence and testimony.127 The Court
ultimately concluded that the order was an unconstitutional
prior restraint on speech—a holding that applies broadly to all
speakers.128 Yet contemplation of press freedom is so interwoven
into the Court’s analysis that it is difficult to identify where the
line shifts from press freedom to speech rights. The Court begins
its opinion, for example, by stating that the question presented
in the case was whether the order violated “the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of the press.”129 Throughout the opinion,
however, the Court situates the case as involving the First
Amendment protection against prior restraints on speech130
124. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
(1980) (“We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
speech and of the press could be eviscerated.” (internal quotations omitted));
see also West, supra note 122, at 741 (2014) (“While there are few cases that
specifically deal with the press, there are many more that focus on matters
that primarily affect the press.”).
125. See RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the
Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV. 253, 255–256 (2014) (“In a
smattering of pre-Sullivan cases and then very consistently throughout a
period that we might call the press ‘Glory Days’ of the 1960s, 1970s, and early
1980s, the Court went out of its way to speak of the press and then offered
effusively complimentary depictions of the media in its opinions.”).
126. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
127. Id. at 542.
128. See id. at 570 (“We hold that, with respect to the order entered in this
case prohibiting reporting or commentary on judicial proceedings held in
public, the barriers have not been overcome; to the extent that this order
restrained publication of such material, it is clearly invalid.”).
129. Id. at 539.
130. See, e.g., id. at 556 (discussing precedent dealing with regulations
that “impose a ‘previous’ or ‘prior’ restraint on speech”); id. at 559 (“A prior
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alone before ultimately landing on a holding based in more
ambiguously worded violations of “the freedom to speak and
publish”131 and “the guarantees of freedom of expression.”132
The Court’s views on the distinction between freedom of
speech and freedom of the press in Nebraska Press Association
are decidedly blurry, as are the particulars of what either phrase
exactly means. The opinion nonetheless makes clear that the
Justices appreciate the underlying importance of a
constitutionally protected free press. The most significant way
the Court conveys this appreciation is through its simple and
consistent mentioning of the constitutional right.133 Between the
Court’s majority opinion and the four concurring opinions in
that case, the Justices made only seven combined references to
“free speech” or the “freedom,” “liberty,” or “right” of speech, yet
they make nineteen such references to the constitutional right
of press freedom.134
Our data reflect this understanding of the Justices’ evolving
relationship to press freedom during the last few decades of the
twentieth century. While they may have been increasingly
relying on the Speech Clause to support their conclusions, the
Justices were still openly turning to principles of press freedom
to inform their thinking.135 Thus, as shown in Figure 3, our data
restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and irreversible
sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after
publication ‘chills’ speech, prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.”
(citation omitted)); id. at 562 (posing the question of whether the defendant’s
right to a fair trial “justifies such invasion of free speech”).
131. Id. at 570.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., id. at 548 (quoting John Jay on the danger of limiting the
freedom of the press); id. at 549 (referencing the balancing between “the right
to a fair trial and the rights of a free press”); id. at 556 (invoking the First
Amendment right to a free press); id. at 557 (noting the right to freedom of the
press); id. at 561 (noting the “the right of the press” against prior restraint).
134. These numbers were tabulated following the guidelines of our
codebook for identifying the constitutional right frame. Thus, they exclude
references that are part of book titles or case names, as well as references that
appear in a footnote or appendix, and include references that appear in the
opinions as a quotation from another source. See supra Part II.
135. See Anderson, supra note 115 at 430 n.3 (noting that even the Justices
themselves sometimes confused a substantive speech right held by all
speakers with a constitutional protection emanating from the Press Clause.).
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show the Justices’ use of the constitutional right framework
remained robust through the beginning of the 1990s.136
Overall, the Court’s post-incorporation treatment of press
freedom is consistent with our findings on the peak period of the
constitutional right framework, which runs from roughly 1935
to 1990.137 Whether as a matter of cause or effect, our data also
show that the Justices who most commonly employed this
framework served on the Court between these years.138 Of the
six Justices who most often discussed the constitutional right of
press freedom, five of them—Justice Hugo Black, Justice
William Douglas, Justice William Brennan, Chief Justice
Warren Burger, and Justice Stanley Reed—served the entirety
of their terms on the Court during this time.139 The other Justice
in this group—Justice Byron White, who was the fourth most
frequent user of this framework—served more than 90%
(twenty-eight of his thirty-one years) during this crucial
period.140 The importance of the constitutional right framework
136. See Figure 3.
137. See infra Part IV.C.
138. See infra Part IV.D.
139. Justice Black (1937–1971) discussed the right 169 times and served
the entirety of his thirty-four years on the Supreme Court during the peak
period of the constitutional right framework. Justice Douglas (1939–1975)
discussed the right 129 times and served the entirety of his thirty-six years on
the Supreme Court during the peak period of the constitutional right
framework. Justice Brennan (1956–1990) discussed the right 102 times and
served the entirety of his thirty-four years on the Supreme Court during the
peak period of the constitutional right framework. Justice Burger (1969–1986)
discussed the right fifty times and served the entirety of his seventeen years
on the Supreme Court during the peak of the Constitutional right framework.
Justice Reed (1938–1957) discussed the right forty-eight times and served the
entirety of his nineteen years on the Supreme Court during the peak of the
Constitutional right framework.
140. Justice White (1962–1993) discussed the right fifty-two times and
served 90.3% of his time on the Supreme Court during the peak period of the
constitutional right framework. The other Justices in the top ten users of the
constitutional right framework are Justice Sutherland (1922–1938)
(thirty-seven times in the three years he served during the framework’s peak
use, equating to .19%); Justice Frankfurter (1929–1962) (thirty-seven times
during his career, the entirety of which was served during the framework’s
peak use); Justice Stewart (1958–1981) (thirty-six times during his career, the
entirety of which was served during the framework’s peak use); and Justice
Stevens (1975–2010) (thirty-five times in the fifteen years he served during
the framework’s peak use, equating to .43%).
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for these Justices is likewise reflected in the percentage of their
overall press references that used this frame. It was Justices
Black and Reed’s most commonly used frame and Justice
Douglas’s second most frequently used frame.141 Our tracking of
the Court’s positive references to the liberty of the press also
peaks during this time period.142 Although these fifty-five years
constitute less than 25% of the 235-year history of the Court,
82% of the total number of positive constitutional right
references are found during this time.
The next chapter of press freedom at the Court generally
correlates with the Roberts Court years, which began in 2005
and continues today. During this period, the Roberts Court
gained a reputation among many as an exceedingly pro-First
Amendment Court.143 According to Joel Gora, the Roberts Court
“may well have been the most speech-protective Court in a
generation, if not in our history.”144 Gregory Magarian likewise
has observed that “[f]ree speech advocates’ conventional (not to
say universal) view of this Court is adoring.”145 Indeed, First
Amendment expansionism seems to be one of Chief Justice
Roberts’s personal guiding principles. He has called himself,
“the most aggressive defender of the First Amendment”146 on the
Court, and he frequently authors opinions in cases involving

141. See infra Part IV.D.
142. See infra Part IV.C.
143. See infra Part V.B.3.
144. Joel M. Gora, Free Speech Matters: The Roberts Court and the First
Amendment, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 63, 64 (2016).
145. Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: The Roberts Court
and Categorical First Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1339, 1340 (2015); see also id. (quoting Burt Neuborne as calling the Roberts
Court “the strongest First Amendment court in history” and Kenneth Star
claiming it is “the most free speech Court in American history” (citations
omitted)). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L.
REV. 723, 724 (2011) [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court]
(“[T]he Roberts Court[] [has a] dismal record of protecting free speech in cases
involving challenges to the institutional authority of the government when it
is regulating the speech of its employees, its students, and its prisoners, and
when it is claiming national security justifications.”).
146. April Hefner, Honorable John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the
United States, Speaks at Belmont University, BELMONT UNIV. (FEB. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/858J-UDK5 (quoting Justice John G. Roberts).
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expressive rights.147 In the words of Ronald Collins and David
Hudson, “Roberts is quite at home in the house of the First
Amendment—it is perhaps his favorite jurisprudential
dwelling.”148
As explored in the next Part, however, the Roberts Court’s
broad embrace of First Amendment values in some areas has
not been extended to the constitutional right of press freedom.
IV. THE DISAPPEARING “FREEDOM OF THE PRESS”
The principle of freedom of the press—once ubiquitous in
the Court’s commentary on constitutional rights—is now rare.
The data show only scant acknowledgement of the concept from
the Roberts Court. Even bare, neutral references to the idea are
now few and far between. This stark abandonment of the Court’s
references to press freedom is particularly glaring even when
situated within the wider trends of an overall decreased
quantity of Supreme Court references to the press. On top of
this, the data associated with Justices who currently sit on the
Court show no frequent invokers of the concept, with the
Roberts Court Justices being true historical outliers on this
front.
This Part explores the study’s data on the disappearance of
“freedom of the press” on several fronts: (A) in the decline of the
raw total instances of reference to freedom of the press over
time; (B) in the decline of the percentage of the times when the
Court is speaking of the press that it is invoking any notion of
freedom of the press; (C) in the lower frequency of reference to a
“freedom of the press” framework in recent Court Terms as
compared to that frame’s overall frequency in the full historical
dataset; and (D) in the linguistic patterns of Justices on the
current Court, as compared to those of their predecessors. On
every axis, the data show that acknowledgement of the right is
on the decline.

147. See Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First
Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (July 21, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/CT7RJD7S (“[Roberts] has written the opinion for the court in a whopping 15 First
Amendment free expression cases.”).
148. Id.
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Declining Frequency of References to Freedom of the Press

The disappearance of press freedom is clear in our raw
numerical data tracking the total numbers of times the concept
is articulated by the Justices of the Court. As seen in Figure 2,
the number of references to freedom of the press by the Justices
has plummeted in the last generation.
As might be expected, Supreme Court references to press
freedom were scant before the incorporation of the First
Amendment149 and the initial recognition of a substantive press
freedom by the Near Court in 1931.150 But once the right was
recognized, it was steadily acknowledged for much of the next
half century.151 In the period from the 1930s to the 1990s, even
at its lowest frequency points, the Court was quite routinely
mentioning press freedom.152 That is, for most of the modern
newsgathering and journalistic era, the Supreme Court’s
consistent acknowledgement of a constitutional right of freedom
of the press was a given.
At some moments in history, the references to the right
have been especially strong. The raw frequency data has a
bimodal peak, with an uptick in 1940 to 1944 that is sandwiched
by two somewhat lower-frequency eras, and followed by a second
especially strong high-point in the five-year period from 1970 to
1974, during which the Court referenced to the concept a total
of 179 times.153 At the historical heights of its frequency, the

149. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666–667 (1925) (holding that
the 14th Amendment extended the First Amendment’s protections to apply to
state governments).
150. See generally Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)
(striking a prior restraint against a newspaper as an unconstitutional
restriction on the First Amendment’s freedoms of speech and press).
151. See supra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 118–125 and accompanying text. Court Terms with
thirty or more references were once relatively common. The dataset shows
thirty-eight in 1972, thirty-five in 1971, forty-five in 1970, thirty-six in 1966,
thirty-one in 1963, thirty in 1956, thirty-three in 1945, forty-one in 1942, and
thirty-three in 1939.
153. Although press-focused cases are not solely responsible for this
uptick, this time period gave rise to some of the most foundational
constitutional cases featuring journalists and media entities as parties. See
generally, e.g., Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Gertz
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Justices at times invoked the concept of press freedom more
than fifty times in a single Term.154
In contrast, in four of the last ten Terms, the Justices have
not made a single reference to the concept of press freedom in
any majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion or in any other
work published in the U.S. Reports. In three additional Terms
during this time period, there was only a single mention of the
concept.155 Indeed, except for one clear outlier Term,156 no Term
of the Roberts Court era has included even double-digit
mentions of press freedom by all nine Justices combined, across
the entire Term.157 Eighty-seven percent of all Terms in the
Roberts Court had three or fewer mentions of the right in any
way. The last positive references to freedom of the press were
more than a decade ago.158 Thus, in a simple assessment of
frequency, we see that a concept that once lived vibrantly within
the Supreme Court’s constitutional rights commentary has
largely exited the lexicon—the Court has seemingly forgotten
this freedom.

v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
154. In both the 1941 Term and the 1973 Term, there were fifty-three
separate paragraphs referencing the freedom of the press. In the 1960 Term,
there were fifty-two references.
155. See infra Part IV.D; infra note 194 and accompanying text.
156. The 2009 Term had eleven total references.
157. There were six references in 2018. There were three references each
in 2005, 2007, and 2019. There were two references in 2006, and one each in
2011, 2013, and 2016. In 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017, there were no
references.
158. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“And
whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing
technology, the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the
First Amendment’s command, do not vary when a new and different medium
for communication appears.” (internal quotations omitted)); Borough of
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) (“It was not by accident or
coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a
single guaranty with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances.” (internal quotations omitted)).
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Declining Percentage of Freedom of the Press Mentions in
Cases Referencing the Press

More complex analyses of press-related trends at the Court
also show the disappearance of the freedom of the press—in
particular, the data comparing the relative frequency of the
constitutional right framing within the fuller set of
press-referencing paragraphs. That is, beyond a decline in the
overall number of mentions of freedom of the press, there also
has been a decline in the percentage of references to press
freedom.
We designed our wider project to inclusively capture every
time the Court mentioned the press or the press function in any
way, even when the Court’s terminology identifying those
functions changed over time.159 Once a paragraph was included
in the dataset, coders then searched it for a variety of common
frames, including for the “Right Frame,” which captured all
references to the constitutional right of press freedom.160
Tracking the references to the Right Frame in proportion to all
other references to the press reveals additional evidence that
this right is disappearing.
During the long post-incorporation period of frequent
“freedom of the press” usage, it was consistently the case that
20% or more of all press mentions made by any Justice in any
context were references to freedom of the press.161 The strong
position that the constitutional right occupied in the Court’s
overall dialogue about press functions is illustrated in Table A,
which provides a summary of the percent of total references to
the press containing the concept of freedom of the press in
five-year periods between 1935 and 1974.

159. See supra Part II.
160. For more discussion of the various common frames, see Jones & West,
Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 387.
161. See Figure 2.
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Figure 2

Table A
Year range

Percent of total
references to the press
containing the concept
of freedom of the press

1935–1939

29.7%

1940–1944

29.2%

1945–1949

22.1%

1950–1954

19.1 %

1955–1959

27.4%

1960–1964

26.4%
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1965–1969

18.6%

1970–1974

13.1%
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In several individual Terms during the peak of the Right
Frame’s usage, it constituted an even larger percentage of total
press references, with the Justices referencing the freedom of
the press more than four in every ten times they spoke of the
press.162 When we review the data throughout the 1930s,163
1940s,164 1950s,165 and 1960s,166 we routinely find Terms in
which 20% to 50% of the press references are making at least
some nod to the constitutional right to a free press.
When this same analysis is conducted on the data from
more recent Terms, the drop-off in references to the right of
freedom of the press is stark. Table B, which reports the
snapshot summary of the percent of total references to the press
containing the concept of freedom of the press in five-year
periods between 1995 and 2019, shows that the percentage has
never exceeded 10% in the recent era.

162. In 1933 (50%), 1937 (45%), 1939 (44.8%), 1942 (44.6%), and 1943
(44.1%), the Court’s press references frequently referred to freedom of the
press.
163. In 1932 (32%), 1933 (50%), 1935 (26.1%), 1937 (45%), and 1939
(41.2%), the Court’s press references made some nod to the constitutional right
of free press.
164. In 1940 (31%), 1941 (38%), 1942 (44.6%), 1943 (44.1%), 1947 (23%),
1948 (33.3%), and 1949 (38%), the Court’s press references made some nod to
the constitutional right of free press.
165. In 1950 (28.1%), 1953 (35.3%), 1956 (33.3%), 1957 (26.3%), and 1959
(48.7%), the Court’s press references made some nod to the constitutional right
of free press.
166. In 1960 (35.1%), 1962 (26.3%), 1963 (25.6%), 1966 (20.5%), 1967
(34.6%), and 1968 (23.5%), the Court’s press references made some nod to the
constitutional right of free press.
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Table B
Term range

Percent of total
references to the
press containing the
concept of freedom
of the press

1995–1999

4.1%

2000–2004

10.8%

2005–2009

7.6%

2010–2014

5.5%

2015–2019

10.2%

Although the Court’s overall references to the press have
declined in recent years,167 the data indicate that the percentage
of references suggesting a constitutional right of press freedom
has also drastically declined in comparison to the percentage of
references in previous years.168 In five separate Terms of the
Roberts Court, the Justices made some references to the press
but never once did so using a “freedom of the press” framing.169
In most other Roberts-era Terms, press freedom hovers in the
range of only 5% to 9% of the total press references.170

167. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 379 (“As an
initial matter, our data show that the Court references the press far less
frequently than it did a half century ago.”).
168. See Figure 4.
169. The “freedom of the press” frame constituted 0% of the overall coding
total in the years 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017.
170. The data show that in 2005 (7.9%), 2006 (9.1%), 2009 (7.2%), 2010
(7.7%), 2011 (9.1%), 2013 (5%), and 2016 (6.7%) the Court’s press references
regarding press freedom never surpassed 10%. Indeed, no individual Term in
the Roberts Court era exceeded 15% of press-freedom references. There were
15% in 2007 and 12% in both 2018 and 2019.
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Within the already diminishing total group of press
references, the “freedom of the press” frame is being eclipsed by
other frames. Notably, the Court’s references are shifting
heavily to the frame that we call the “Communication” frame,
which captures instances in which the Court simply
acknowledges an act of journalism or the fact that the media was
used to make something publicly known.171 These bare
references to the communication function of the press
constituted, on average, about a fifth of the mentions of the press
in the years between 1935 and 1974. During the Roberts Court
era, they average nearly half of all mentions; specifically, in
eight of the last fifteen years, more than 50% of all mentions
were simply saying that the media exists or that news was
published.
The combined data show that in the past, when the topic of
the press or press functions came up, the Court routinely took
the opportunity to speak of the freedom of the press.172 To the
extent that the topics come up today, the Court is more often
simply noting that the press function occurs, omitting the
constitutional right from the mention.173 The framing of the
press function as something that is rights-bearing or housed
within a constitutional freedom is disappearing.
C. Underperformance of the Frame
Compared to its Overall Expected Frequency
The modern-era disappearance of press freedom is further
confirmed by a more detailed quantitative analysis of the
“freedom of the press” frame’s performance against its own
likelihood in the full dataset. Using our full historical data and
the total sets of references to the press within every framing, we
set out to predict how many references to the press might
ordinarily be expected and to judge the modern data against this
baseline. The analysis confirms that references to the
constitutional right of press freedom are seriously
underrepresented in the Roberts Court era.
171. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 401 n.89.
172. See supra Part III.B.
173. See, e.g., Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 424–25
(explaining that Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch have almost exclusively
referenced the press “as an information delivery mechanism”).
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A z-score, or standard score, is a measure of how many
standard deviations below or above the population mean a raw
score is. It is a mechanism for comparing results to a so-called
“normal” population. Here, our “normal” is the incidence of the
constitutional right framing that we would expect over all time,
given the full set of data. Thus, the z-score reveals how much
the press-freedom frame is over- or under-performing its
“normal” at any given time period. By creating z-scores for each
frame’s number of references, we are able to directly compare
just how discrepant any period is for a frame’s incidence.
We examined the extent to which each frame in every
half-decade period was above or below the average for that
frame across all the half-decade periods studied. Figure 3 shows
these z-score results for references to freedom of the press. In
the bar plot, positive values on the y-axis indicate that the
frame’s count in that half-decade is above average by the listed
standard deviations relative to the frame’s overall quantity in
the data. Negative values indicate that the frame’s count in that
half-decade is below average.
Figure 3
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The z-score analysis, quite expectedly, shows freedom of the
press references turning to stronger relative activity from the
early- to mid-1930s onward, once the Court incorporated the
First Amendment and acknowledged modern press freedom in
Near.174 The over-performance of the frame based on its z-score
peaks abruptly in the 1970s and then sharply declines, with
freedom of the press essentially collapsing as a concept by the
mid-1990s.175
The underperformance of the press-freedom frame from its
overall expected frequency is further confirmed through an
additional model that more squarely compares the Justices’
usage patterns in different eras. We analyzed the underlying
press freedom-reference trends from a baseline era of 1935 to
1974.176 We then applied those identical trends to predict what
the expected reference numbers would be in a later era, from
1995 to 2019. Figure 4, showing the resulting discrepancies,
demonstrates a clear behavioral shift in the Justices’
willingness to refer to press freedom. Had the tendencies of the
1935 to 1974 Justices been in play from 1995 to 2019, we would
expect to see almost 278 references to the notion of a
constitutional right of freedom of the press. In actuality, we see
just sixty-four, which is only 23% of the expected value.
Moreover, Figure 4 shows that this discrepancy is greater in the
constitutional right frame than it is in any other studied frame.
Notably, when the same data is analyzed within tonal
categories, we again see that the numbers of expected references
fall short for both positive and neutral mentions.177 While both
varieties of references to press freedom have collapsed since the
baseline era, it is positive references that have fallen the most.

174. See supra Part III.B.
175. See Figure 3.
176. The baseline era trends were established by identifying the rate of
mentions per case for each of 112 unique combinations of press frames and
broad Supreme Court Database issue areas. An example illustrates: For the
Regulation Frame during the 1935 to 1974 period, there were on average 2.3
mentions per case in First Amendment cases, but only 0.06 mentions per case
in Economic Activity cases. These frame-issue area rates were then applied to
the specific mixture of cases the Court decided during the second compared
era.
177. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 395–96.
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Figure 4

Our analyses therefore show that, even when compared with its
own expected frequency and controlling for an overall declining
number of total references to the press, the Court’s invocation of
“freedom of the press” as a concept is in stark decline.
D.

Freedom of the Press and the Justices of the Court

Finally, the disappearance of freedom of the press is evident
in comparisons between the current Justices’ press-freedom
patterns and those of their predecessors. Both our quantitative
data and the contextual clues within this data show a massive
institutional shift in the Justices’ collective approach to press
freedom, of a degree not seen since the First Amendment’s
incorporation. Court-wide acknowledgement of a constitutional
right has been essentially abandoned. Indeed, the dataset
reveals that most of the current Justices have rarely, if ever,
mentioned press freedom in any context, and that there appear
to be no true advocates of the right on the Court.178
178.

See Figure 5.
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The Justices who most frequently mentioned the
constitutional right of press freedom all sat on the Court during
the post-incorporation eras of the 1930s through the 1990s. At
the top of this list are Justices who referred to the concept more
than one hundred separate times,179 the last of whom, Justice
Brennan, left the Court in 1990.180 No recent Justice has even
approached that level of reference. Justice Clarence Thomas,
the highest scoring “press-freedom” invoker on the current
Court, has fewer references to the concept in nearly three
decades on the bench than Justice Black had in just the period
between 1940 and 1942.181
Even more telling than snapshots of individual Justices’
behavior is the more global data showing a change in the
likelihood that the Court will acknowledge freedom of the press
across the board. Several separate analyses of the data make
clear that the level of press-freedom references in the earlier
post-incorporation eras was not a function of any particular
Justice’s frequency of reference but instead of a consistent,
Court-wide recognition of the right that now has disappeared.
Notably, during the Terms in the dataset in which the
numbers of references to the constitutional right of freedom of
the press are particularly high, the mentions did not come from
a small number of especially press-praising Justices. Rather,
Justices who varied in ideology, background, and friendliness
toward the press appear to have shared a common, baseline
acknowledgement of the constitutional right of press freedom.
An illuminating illustration is seen in the data of Justice Byron
White. As a matter of overall tone, Justice White was the least
press-friendly Justice of all time;182 nonetheless, he made more
than fifty separate references to the concept of freedom of the

179. Justice Hugo Black did so 169 times; Justice William O. Douglas 129
times; and Justice William Brennan 102 times.
180. William J. Brennan, Jr., OYEZ, https://perma.cc/32MX-DY6T.
181. Justice Thomas has made twenty-eight total references to freedom of
the press, while Justice Black made thirty-one references between 1940 and
1942 (five references in the 1940 Term, nineteen references in the 1941 Term,
and seven references in the 1942 Term).
182. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 418.
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press183—more than 50% more mentions per Term than any
member of the Roberts Court.184 Justice White routinely found
that the values at stake in individual cases outweighed press
freedom or that protection was not warranted in the particular
circumstances, but he nonetheless consistently acknowledged
the existence and relevancy of the right.
In an effort to further explore Court-wide behavior, we
calculated the press-freedom career averages of every Justice
across time, investigating the average number of mentions per
Term made by each Justice. We again found, across the board,
that previous Justices made far more frequent reference to the
principle of freedom of the press than today’s Justices do. For
example, Figure 5 contrasts the full-career patterns of the nine
Justices who sat on the Court in 1964, the year in which New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan185 was decided, with the records of
the nine Justices who were sitting on the Court when our study
concluded in July 2020. The 1964 Court’s Justices spoke of press
freedom regularly—not just in Sullivan or in the Term in which
Sullivan was decided but across their often very long careers on
the bench.186 Only one Justice on the 1964 Court, Justice Tom
Clark, had a career-long average of less than one press-freedom
reference per Term,187 and even he authored fifteen total
mentions of the concept in his eighteen years as a Justice.
Conversely, there is no Justice on the 2020 Court with a career
average of even one press-freedom mention per Term.188 Eight
of the nine Justices of the current Court have an average of less
183. Justice White authored fifty-two total paragraphs that were coded as
containing references to press freedom.
184. Justice White was on the Court for thirty-one years and averaged 1.7
references per Term. Justice Clarence Thomas is the highest averaging
current Justice, with 0.97 references per Term.
185. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
186. Justice Black had a career average of 5 references per Term, Justice
Goldberg 4, Justice Douglas 3.4, Justice Brennan 1.9, Justice Warren 1.9,
Justice Stewart 1.6, Justice White 1.6, and Justice Harlan 1.5.
187. Justice Clark, who served on the Court from 1948 to 1967, had a
career average of 0.83 references per Term.
188. As of July 2020, only one current Justice had come close. Justice
Clarence Thomas had made twenty-eight press-freedom references in his
nearly twenty-nine years on the Court, for a career average of 0.97 references
per Term.
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than one press-freedom mention for every three Terms on the
Court, and three of them have no mentions at all.189 The career
per-Term average of Justice Clark, the lowest scorer of the
earlier era, was at least three times larger than the per-Term
averages of every Justice on the current Court except Justice
Thomas.
Figure 5

Average per-Term references

It is not simply a change in the Court’s overall caseload that
produces these stark comparisons. When we investigate the
Justices’ average number of references to press freedom
per-opinion, as opposed to per-Term, the disparities between
time periods are similarly glaring. As illustrated in Figure 6,
Justices from the earlier era universally outpace their modern
189. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito both had an
average of 0.27 mentions per Term, while Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg had
an average of 0.15 mentions per Term, Justice Stephen Breyer 0.11, and
Justice Elena Kagan 0.10. Justices Brett Kavanaugh, Neil Gorsuch, and Sonia
Sotomayor had never mentioned freedom of the press.
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counterparts in reference to freedom of the press even when the
inquiry is controlled for shrinking docket sizes and changing
overall numbers of opinions authored per Term.
Figure 6

Average per-opinion references

The data indicate near-uniform recognition of the right for
most of the Court’s earlier post-incorporation eras. The
distribution of references across Justices in this period was
broad. For example, in the 1960 Term and again in the 1973
Term, there were more than fifty total references to freedom of
the press over the course of the Term.190 These mentions did not
come at the hands of a few press-freedom activists; rather, the
data show that seven of the nine Justices referenced the right.191
190. There were fifty-two references in the 1960 Term and fifty-three
references in the 1973 Term.
191. The fifty-two references in the 1960 Term included eighteen from
Justice Hugo Black, sixteen from Chief Justice Earl Warren, eight from
Justice William O. Douglas, five from Justice William Brennan, three from
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This same breadth of acknowledgement—with a far-reaching
distribution of mentions across much of the Court—was true of
every other especially high-frequency Term during the
pre-Roberts Court period.192 The Justices were homogenous in
their steady acknowledgment of a free-press right.
The tide has now turned at the Court; there is now
homogeneity in taking nearly no notice of the right. Positive,
praising references to the right of press freedom have all but
vanished,193 and while all of the Justices might have once
mentioned the right in a given Term, it is now regularly the case
that almost none of them do so. In five of the fifteen Terms since
John Roberts became Chief Justice, no Justices at all have
invoked the concept.194 In three of those fifteen Terms, only a
single Justice has done so.195
The total number of times that every Justice who was sitting
on the Court in June 2020 invoked the right of press freedom
during their combined careers is only forty-six. This is fewer
references than appeared in a single Term at several points in
earlier eras196 and fewer references than were made by Justice
Hugo Black in just a handful of his particularly active Terms.197

Justice Tom C. Clark, and one each from Justices Potter Stewart and John
Marshall Harlan II. The fifty-three references in the 1973 Term included
fifteen from Justice William O. Douglas, twelve from Justice Lewis Powell,
seven each from Justices Potter Stewart and Byron White, six from Justice
William O. Brennan, five from Chief Justice Warren Burger, and one from
Justice William Rehnquist.
192. For example, in 1941, there were fifty-three references made by six of
the nine Justices. In 1970, there were forty-five references made by seven of
the nine Justices. In 1942, there were forty-one references made by eight of
the nine Justices.
193. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
194. In four of the last ten Terms—2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017—there have
been no references to freedom of the press of any sort by any Justice in any
material published in the U.S. Reports.
195. In five other Roberts-era Terms, only two Justices referenced the
right.
196. In the 1941 Term, there were fifty-three total references to freedom
of the press; in the 1960 Term, fifty-two; and in the 1973 Term, fifty-three.
197. Justice Hugo Black’s highest Terms of usage were 1941 (nineteen
references), 1960 (eighteen), 1945 (sixteen), and 1970 (twelve). In just these
four Terms, he amassed more mentions of the right of freedom of the press
than all nine current Justices combined.
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A more direct statistical comparison with former Justices
confirms the extent to which the Roberts Court Justices are
clear outliers on this principle. We compared these nine Justices
to former Justices to determine whether this group’s forty-six
total mentions is aberrationally low. The nine Justices sitting
on the Court in July 2020 who generated the forty-six references
had served a cumulative total of 140 Terms on the Court. Over
the entire history of the Court, there have been a total of 1,986
Terms of Justice service.198 In an effort to determine how
discrepant that July 2020 group is compared to other slates of
Justice-Term combinations, we randomly selected 140 of those
1,986 Justice-Term observations to count the number of
references to freedom of the press in the random subset, and
then repeated the process for a total of 25,000 investigations.
The results, depicted in Figure 7, indicate that the Roberts
Court Justices are indeed making far fewer references to
freedom of the press as a group on a per-Term basis.199 A
remarkable 97% of the randomly selected sample sets yielded
more press-freedom references than the Roberts Court Justices.
This random sampling drew upon the full slate of Justice-Term
combinations—including those that occurred before the First
Amendment was incorporated, before the existence of the
modern press, and before any press references occurred at the
Court—and yet the Roberts Court Justices’ collective mentions
of freedom of the press still pale in comparison.

198. This formula gives Term credit to any Justice who cast at least one
vote during a Term.
199. The median number of references is eighty-two, with twenty-fifth and
seventy-fifth percentile values of sixty-eight and ninety-eight, respectively.
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Figure 7

An analysis of current Justices’ individual references to
press freedom confirms the scope and magnitude of this
institutional shift. When our study concluded in June 2020,
eight of the nine Justices serving that Term had never positively
referenced press freedom in all their time on the Court.200 Three
of the nine Justices on the Court had not made a single reference
of any variety to the concept of freedom of the press in any
published Supreme Court document.201 Two of these Justices
200. The only currently sitting Justice to do so is Justice Clarence Thomas,
although none of his positive references were in a context involving the
application of the freedom to a journalist or news organization.
201. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 425 n.174.
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with zero mentions—Gorsuch and Kavanaugh—were
newcomers with a shared total of only five years on the Court at
the time our study concluded.202 Justice Sonia Sotomayor,
however, had been on the Court for eleven years and had plenty
of opportunity.203 By the close of our study, Justice Sotomayor
had written fifteen opinions in cases classified by the Supreme
Court Database as being within the First Amendment issue area
and had mentioned some aspect of the press or the press
function sixty-eight different times. Indeed, with an average of
more than six such mentions per Term, her frequency outpaced
that of every other sitting Justice. Yet she has never noted even
the conceptual existence of freedom of the press.204
At the conclusion of our study, five of the remaining six
Justices had referenced press freedom with only single-digit
frequency in their entire careers, despite having been on the
Court for more than a decade. It is unsurprising that this group
includes Justice Samuel Alito,205 who has publicly criticized
some members of the press;206 however, it also includes Justice
Elena Kagan, the Justice with the strongest First Amendment
background before joining the Court.207 Prior to her
202. Gorsuch joined the Court on April 7, 2017 and had been a Justice for
3 years at the time this study concluded in July 2020. Adam Liptak & Matt
Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme Court Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/FV2P-RTXQ. Kavanaugh joined
the Court on October 6, 2018 and had been a Justice for 2 years. Brett
Kavanaugh Confirmation: Victory for Trump in Supreme Court Battle, BBC
(Oct. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/54Z8-QQWT.
203. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 424 n.169.
204. In the full set of Justice Sotomayor’s overall press references, she used
a press-positive tone only 11.8% of the time, so the wider body of her
jurisprudence likewise shows no signals of press friendliness. See Jones &
West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 425 n.174.
205. Justice Alito referenced freedom of the press just four times in nearly
fifteen years on the Court, for a career-to-date average of 0.27 references per
Term. None of Justice Alito’s references were tonally positive.
206. See Ed O’Keefe, Samuel Alito v. The Press, CNN,
https://perma.cc/9XAL-AP7Y (last updated Nov. 18, 2014, 7:24 AM) (quoting
Justice Alito as saying that, while the full-time press corps covering the Court
is largely competent, some news columnists are “not very knowledgeable”).
207. See generally Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment
Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of
Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 29 (1992); Elena Kagan,
Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
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confirmation to the Court, Justice Kagan had “worked on
free-speech and free-press issues more than any recent high
court nominee.”208 Despite this history, she has been
surprisingly silent during her decade on the Court on the issue
of freedom of the press, with only a single mention of the
principle.209 Also in this group were two of the Court’s
then-longest-serving members, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Justice Stephen Breyer, who had each been on the Court for
more than a quarter of a century, but had made only four210 and
three211 total references to freedom of the press, respectively.

873 (1993); Elena Kagan, When a Speech Code Is a Speech Code: The Stanford
Policy and the Theory of Incidental Restraints, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957
(1996); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413
(1996).
208. Elena Kagan, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (May 13,
2010), https://perma.cc/H4DS-TRXD.
209. For Justice Kagan’s sole reference to freedom of the press, see Ariz.
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 767–68 (2011)
(Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan alluded to the concept only in passing,
without any positive tonal overlay, when noting in her dissent that the Court
had previously held that “[t]he central purpose of the Speech and Press
Clauses . . . was to assure a society in which uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open public debate concerning matters of public interest would thrive, for
only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy flourish.” Id. at
767 (internal quotations omitted).
210. Justice Ginsburg, whose final year on the Court was the last year
included in the dataset, had been on the Court for twenty-seven years but had
referenced freedom of the press only four times—all in neutral, rather than
positive, ways. One of Justice Ginsberg’s four references to freedom of the
press is merely a quote of an earlier opinion noting “[a] contention cannot be
seriously considered which assumes that freedom of the press includes a right
to raise money to promote circulation by deception of the public.” Illinois, ex
rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (quoting
Donaldson v. Read Mag., 333 U.S. 178, 192 (1948)).
211. None of Justice Breyer’s references invokes the concept in a way that
leads to the protection of newsgathering or broader press functions. One of his
three mentions of press freedom notes “the Constitution’s general command
that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press,’” but then goes on to note that, “[a]t the same time, our cases have not
left Congress or the States powerless to address the most serious problems.”
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n,
518 U.S. 727 (1996). Justice Breyer’s reference noted “the Constitution’s
general command that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press,’” but then went to note that “[a]t the same time, our
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Chief Justice John Roberts himself has done almost nothing
to keep the constitutional right of freedom of the press
conceptually alive during his time on the Court. In his fifteen
years as Chief Justice, Roberts alluded to freedom of the press
or a free press only four times and never once referenced the
right with a positive connotation. One early reference from
Roberts pointed to a past Court’s apparent application of the
right.212 The other references were all noting the right of
freedom of the press in the course of dismissing its applicability.
On two separate occasions—representing 50% of his total career
mentions—Roberts referenced freedom of the press only to say
that “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part carried out by means of
language.”213 On another occasion, he asserted that “it rarely
has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in a violation of a valid criminal
statute.”214
Justice Clarence Thomas’s references to press freedom
reveal a similar pattern. Quantitatively, Justice Thomas comes
out as the Roberts Court’s clear leader in the “freedom of the
press” analysis.215 Although his usage pales in comparison to
that of Justices on the Court at the height of the frame’s
reference a half-century ago, Justice Thomas did mention the
concept twenty-eight times, an average of just under once a
Term. Four of these adopted a positive tone, and the remaining
twenty-four were neutral references. Although a number of
Thomas’ mentions were concentrated in a few opinions that

cases have not left Congress or the States powerless to address the most
serious problems.” Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
212. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 348 (2006) (citing
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) as “invalidating
state sales tax under the Free Press Clause”).
213. Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62
(2006) (internal quotation omitted); see also Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017).
214. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010) (quoting New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761–62 (1982)).
215. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 423.
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directly quote the text of the First Amendment,216 he continued
to mention the concept over time, including as recently as the
2018 and 2019 Terms.217 Justice Thomas, however, presents a
peculiar dynamic: the Court’s top user of the press-freedom
frame is also widely understood to be the most aggressive
advocate for scaling back foundational press protections.218 For
example, four of his most recent references to press freedom
came in his concurrence in denial of certiorari in McKee v.
Cosby,219 which scholars viewed as one of the most
press-threatening opinions of the modern era because it urged
the abandonment of the foundational New York Times v.
Sullivan standard.220 While not specifically tracked as part of
our broader empirical study, observations about Justice
Thomas’s practice of sandwiching “freedom of the press”
references between negative tonal discussions of the press—and
alongside broad assertions that the Founders would not have
protected the press under the circumstances—show that even
current Justices’ rare references to the concept may not be
contributing to an ongoing viable right of meaningful
constitutional dimension.
In total, our quantitative data on the current Court’s
extremely limited references to the constitutional right of press
216. Fourteen of Justice Thomas’s paragraphs, accounting for half of his
total mentions, were contained in a single case. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (holding that a
prohibition on anonymous campaign literature violates the First Amendment).
217. See McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 677 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The Court took it upon itself to define the proper accommodation
between two competing interests—the law of defamation and freedoms of
speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” (internal quotations
omitted)); United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1583 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court concluded that the law was
unconstitutional because it d[id] not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, swe[pt] within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of
freedom of speech or of the press.” (internal quotations omitted)).
218. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Clarence Thomas’s Two Attacks on
Basic Freedoms, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2019, 5:46 AM),
https://perma.cc/2DLV-HYTZ (last updated Mar. 8, 2019, 3:30 PM).
219. 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019).
220. See id. at 680–82 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Chemerinsky,
supra note 218; Steve Vladek, Trump’s Attacks on the First Amendment and
the Press Gain an Ally in Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 20, 2019, 11:18 AM), https://perma.cc/C94Y-4F7P.
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freedom, coupled with our observations about the specific
contexts accompanying that rhetoric, strongly suggest that the
U.S. Supreme Court has experienced a far-reaching
institutional change. The broad-based, Court-wide recognition
of the principle has given way to a sweeping shift: the
disappearance of the freedom of the press.
V.

EXPLORING POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE
DISAPPEARANCE

While our data unquestionably reveal that Supreme Court
references to the concept of a constitutional right of freedom of
the press are disappearing, why they are disappearing is a
harder question. A complex set of causal factors is surely at
work, and the changing Court dynamics are intertwined with
changing media landscapes, changing press behaviors, and
changing public perceptions in ways that scholars from a
number of disciplines have explored and will continue to
investigate in the face of this new data. Importantly, though,
our dataset did provide opportunities to test some potential
explanations for these trends, including chances to probe
whether the findings are solely a result of shifts in ideological
makeup of the Court, the Court’s smaller press-related docket,
or the existence of settled law in the area. Although each is an
initially appealing explanation, our analysis suggests that none
fully account for the disappearance of the freedom of the press.
A.

Ideological Shifts at the Court

One initially appealing explanation is that the
disappearance of references to freedom of the press is solely the
result of ideological shifts at the Court. While the data do
provide some support for this explanation, our analyses across
a number of other measures suggest that there is more to the
erasure of press freedom than just the Court’s changing
ideological composition.
To conduct these analyses, we mapped the probability of a
press-freedom mention onto each Justice’s Martin-Quinn score,
a widely used model that places U.S. Supreme Court Justices on
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a liberal-conservative ideological spectrum.221 Higher
Martin-Quinn scores indicate greater conservativism and lower
scores indicate greater liberalism.222
There is an intuitive logic behind the instinct to attribute
the press-freedom trend to Justices’ ideologies. The stark
modern drop-off of references to the constitutional right did
happen during a time period in which the Supreme Court swung
significantly to the right and the median Martin-Quinn scores
of the Justices increased.223 And the data do show that at least
some prominent liberal Justices of the previous eras were major
promoters of the concept of press freedom.224 The three most
frequent mentioners of freedom of the press—Justices Black,225

221. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court,
1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145–52 (2002). For updated Martin-Quinn
scores, see Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, https://perma.cc/TR4G-PQ8W.
222. The historic span of Martin-Quinn ranges from a most-liberal score of
less than -7, which was Justice William O. Douglas’s rating during the periods
between 1965 to 1975, to a most-conservative score of 4.5, which was
then-Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist during the period from 1975 to
1979. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 221, at 145.
223. See Michael A. Bailey, If Trump Appoints a Third Justice, the
Supreme Court Would Be the Most Conservative It’s Been Since 1950, WASH.
POST (Sept. 22, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/7R7J-EWSJ; Michael A.
Bailey, Is Today’s Court the Most Conservative in Sixty Years? Challenges and
Opportunities in Measuring Judicial Preferences, 75 J. POL. 821, 829 (2013)
(quoting data suggesting “that the contemporary Court is more conservative
than any other time since 1937”); Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most
Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2010), https://perma.cc/P84PZTPT; see also Measures, supra note 221.
224. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 411.
225. Justice Hugo Black referenced the right of a free press 169 times, 22%
of which had an affirmatively positive tone. His career-wide average
Martin-Quinn score was -1.8—more liberal than the 2019 Term score of
Justice Elena Kagan and identical in score to Justice Stephen Breyer.
Measures, supra note 221.
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Douglas,226 and Brennan,227—are all Justices with broader
records as liberals.228 Each made more than one hundred
separate mentions of the right over their time on the Court.
Likewise, other notable liberal Justices of the past have high
frequency scores on mentions of press freedom.229
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, when we investigate the overall
historical data, we find a link between Justices’ ideology and
their likelihood of invoking the concept of freedom of the press.
Throughout the entirety of the Court’s history, liberal Justices
have mentioned press freedom more often than conservative
Justices have.
We produced a model based on the full data since 1784 to
examine the Justices’ likelihood of characterizing the press in
any framing, including a “freedom of the press” frame.230 The
model controls for both the number of First Amendment
opinions the Justice wrote and the number of non-First

226. Justice William O. Douglas referenced the right of a free press 129
times, 21% of which had an affirmatively positive tone. Justice Douglas’s
career-wide average Martin-Quinn score was -4.9. Id. Over a ten-year period
near the end of his time on the Court, he averaged -7 or higher, which is the
most liberal Martin-Quinn score in history. Id.
227. Justice William Brennan referenced the right of a free press 102
times, 25% of which had an affirmatively positive tone. His career-wide
average Martin-Quinn score was -1.6. Id.
228. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court
Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U.L. REV. 1483, 1518, 1531
(2007).
229. Justice John Paul Stevens (Martin-Quinn score of -2.4) had thirty-five
mentions of press freedom. Measures, supra note 221. Justice Frank Murphy
(Martin-Quinn score of -1.6) had thirty-four mentions. Id. Chief Justice Earl
Warren (Martin-Quinn score of -1.3) had thirty-one mentions. Id. Justice
Thurgood Marshall (Martin-Quinn score of -3.2) had thirty mentions. Id.
230. This model treats each Justice-Term-frame-ideology combination as
a separate observation. Because we studied seven separate framings of the
press, in each Term with nine justices there are a total of seventy-two
observations. A Justice was included in this data regardless of whether he or
she had any references for a given frame in a given Term but would be recorded
with a zero for frames that were not invoked by the Justice. This approach,
which produced 6,040 observations, creates a picture of both the mentions and
the non-mentions of the press and, when mapped onto the available
Martin-Quinn ideology data, captures all changes in ideology, because
Martin-Quinn scores vary from Term-to-Term.
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Amendment opinions.231 Figure 8 shows the effect of ideology on
a Justice’s predicted frequency of freedom of the press mentions
for each Term.
In this broad-overview model, conservatism is, in fact,
associated with a decreased tendency to reference the freedom
of the press. As depicted in Figure 8, a hypothetical Justice with
a Martin-Quinn score of -7.5, which is approximately the score
of Justice Douglas in the late 1960s (the most liberal Justice
score of all time),232 would make 3.3 references to press freedom
per Term. A Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of -2.5, which is
approximately the score of Justice Brennan in the late 1970s,233
would be predicted to make two references per Term, and a
Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of 1.35, which was Justice
Kennedy’s score in the late 1980s,234 would be predicted to make
1.3 references. A Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of 4.5, which
is approximately the score of Justice Rehnquist in the late 1970s
(the most conservative score of all time),235 would make only
about 0.9 mentions.

231. The data show that 73% of press-freedom mentions take place in cases
classified by the Supreme Court Database as First Amendment cases. See The
Supreme Court Database: Analysis Overview, WASH. UNIV. LAW,
https://perma.cc/E7BK-VSD3. Controlling for this helps examine the true
variables of interest—ideology and references to freedom of the press—and
addresses the statistical concern that a Justice’s underlying proclivity to
mention freedom of the press could also be correlated with the number of
opinions the Justice writes in the issue area most closely associated with
freedom of the press.
232. See supra note 226.
233. See supra note 227.
234. See Measures, supra note 221.
235. See id.
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Figure 8

This model alone, however, does not completely explain the
extent to which freedom of the press references disappeared.
Some of our other data on Justices’ ideology, moreover, cut
against this narrative and suggest there is more going on than
simply the Court’s most recent ideological shift. Notably, for
example, we find that ideology has essentially no marginal effect
on a Justice’s likelihood of depicting the freedom of the press
with a positive tone.236 If ideology were the primary driver of the
Justices’ views of the value of press freedom, then presumably
we would see a correlation between the Justices’ ideology and
the tone with which they speak of the concept. But this link does
not exist.
To test this question, we again employed Martin-Quinn
ideology data. We charted the effect on the probability that a
Justice will adopt a particular tone within the frame when the
Martin-Quinn score is shifted one unit (or one point) toward the
236.

See Figure 9.
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more conservative end of the scale.237 While ideology has an
effect on tone in some frames, we find that the influence of a
Justice’s ideology on the constitutional right frame is essentially
nonexistent, meaning that, generally, liberal and conservative
Justices are equally likely to celebrate the notion of freedom of
the press. Indeed, Figure 9, which depicts the interaction
between ideology and all frames, shows that for both the positive
and the neutral uses of the constitutional right framing, the
marginal effect of ideology on press freedom depictions hovers
near zero.

237. This one-unit difference is about the difference during the Court’s
2007 Term between either Chief Justice John Roberts (1.42) and Justice
Anthony Kennedy (0.41) or between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Antonin
Scalia (2.46). Measures, supra note 221. It is also the approximate distance, in
the 2013 Term, between Justice Elena Kagan (-1.62) and Justice Sonia
Sotomayor (-2.58). Id.
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Figure 9

These data suggest that the disappearance of positive
mentions of freedom of the press is not happening at the hand
of any one ideological wing of the Court. We also parsed the data
more finely to investigate the interaction of ideology with the
frame over time, essentially looking for any indication that
ideology once had an impact on positive usage but no longer
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does, or vice versa. We find no significant effects.238 There is no
evidence that ideology has been a reliable predictor of a Justice’s
frequency of positive references to the right of press freedom
during any era of our dataset.
Focusing more closely on the work of the Roberts Court
Justices further belies the suggestion that ideology alone
explains the stark decline in press freedom references. On a
more granular level—and potentially key to thinking about the
current role of ideology on press freedom—there are simply no
quantitative or qualitative data to suggest that the Court’s most
recent liberal Justices are press-freedom advocates. Indeed, at
the time our study concluded, no sitting liberal Justice had ever
referenced the freedom of the press in a positive tone.239 Justices
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan, the current Justices whose
Martin-Quinn scores place them furthest to the left on the
ideological spectrum,240 had made fewer than five combined
references to freedom of the press in their total time on the
Court, and all of these were neutral in tone.241 Justice
Sotomayor, whose Martin-Quinn score marks her as the most
liberal of the current Justices, contributed no press-freedom
references to this total, as she had never once mentioned press

238. This examination was made with the aggregation and reduction of the
data to the number of neutral and positive mentions by Justice by Term.
239. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 426 (“In nearly
three decades on the bench, [Justice Ginsburg] referenced the ‘freedom of the
press’ and related concepts only four times, three of which were tonally
neutral, and only once suggested that the right was special or valuable.”); id.
at 427 (“Despite serving on the Court for more than a quarter century, [Justice
Breyer] has invoked the principle of ‘freedom of the press’ only three times and
has never done so in an overtly positive manner.”); id. at 428 (“Justice Kagan’s
frequency is the lowest among her peers on the current Court, and even among
these rare characterizations, her negativity outpaces her positivity.” (citation
omitted)).
240. Justice Sotomayor’s Martin-Quinn score in 2019 was -3.48; Justice
Breyer’s -1.87; and Justice Kagan’s -1.62. Measures, supra note 221. Justice
Ginsburg, whose Martin-Quinn score for 2019 was -2.82, the second most
liberal, was also on the Court through the conclusion of this study’s dataset in
July 2020. She had a career-long total of only four references to press freedom,
none of which was positive in tone.
241. Justice Kagan had made one reference; Justice Breyer had made
three; and Justice Sotomayor had made none. Jones & West, Empirical Study,
supra note 70, at 427–28.
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freedom or a free press in any way in all of her then-eleven years
on the Court.242
The most frequent referencer of press freedom today is, in
fact, the Court’s most conservative Justice, Clarence
Thomas243—although his total number of mentions pales in
comparison to the totals of even the less frequent mentioners
from the 1930s to 1980s.244 Overall, the Roberts Court
conservatives have low numbers of press-freedom mentions
compared to their peers in the preceding era, just as the Roberts
Court liberals do. While Justices of all ideological stripes once
seemed to accept a foundational premise of press freedom, there
are no indicators in either the quantitative or the qualitative
data to suggest that any current Justice has active interest in
the constitutional right, particularly as any kind of
operationally protective principle for newsgatherers. At an
individual-Justice level, changes in the ideological composition
of the Court do not explain the disappearance of freedom of the
press.
All told, despite some clear overarching indications of
relationship between ideology and press-freedom mentions, it
does not appear to be the case that changes in Justices’ ideology
are the sole factor behind the departure of freedom of the press
from the Supreme Court’s lexicon. Justices across the ideological
spectrum were more likely to mention freedom of the press in
earlier eras and are less likely to do so now. Changes in the
ideological makeup of the Court cannot be the driving cause of
the disappearance.

242. Justice Sotomayor has referenced the press more generally, but she
does not make mention of the constitutional freedom of the press. See id.
(noting that “when . . . Justices are compared by their averages per year
served on the Court, [Sotomayor] is ranked first among the sitting Justices for
frequency of press mentions” and that “she has referenced the press or a press
function 68 times, for an average of 6.09 references per year”).
243. Justice Thomas had a 2019 Martin-Quinn score of 3.69. Measures,
supra note 221.
244. Thomas has mentioned freedom of the press twenty-eight times in his
nearly twenty-nine years on the Court, for an average of 0.97 references per
year.
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Fewer Opportunities to Reference Press Freedom

Other potential explanations for the right’s disappearance
focus on the possibility that the legal and media landscapes in
which the Justices work are changing, rather than the language
and practices of the Justices themselves. Under these views, the
Roberts Court is referencing the freedom of the press less often
because it has fewer opportunities to do so. But the data cast
doubt on these explanations.
1.

Reduction in Overall References to the Press

One theory might be that it is not “freedom of the press”
that is disappearing from the Court’s opinions but rather the
broader concept of the press itself. That is, as the country moved
from an era featuring a more recognizable institutional press to
one with a more complicated media terrain, discussion of the
press declined overall, and with that decline came a
commensurate decline in references to press freedom. Our wider
study confirms that the overall frequency of mentions of the
press is itself in sharp decline in Supreme Court opinions.245 But
this decline alone does not explain the linguistic and conceptual
abandonment of “freedom of the press.” Indeed, two important
sets of data strongly suggest that something more is happening
on the press-freedom front than a simple decline in overall
attention to the press.

245. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 390; Figures
10, 11.
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Figure 11
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First, data reveal that the press freedom frame is in sharper
decline than other press frames. Thus, even considering the
reduced amount of overall press mentions, reference to press
freedom is on the decline. A reduction in freedom of the press
references that merely reflected an overall decline in references
to the press might be expected to have a stable proportion of
press-freedom references within the smaller, modern set of
press references. As discussed above, however, this is not the
case. While close to 30% of all press references mentioned press
freedom for much of the 1930s to 1990s,246 these mentions are
now consistently below 10%.247 Within the already diminishing
total group of press references, the constitutional right frame is
being eclipsed by other frames. Notably, the Court’s references
are shifting heavily to the frame that we call the
“Communication” frame, which captures instances in which the
Court simply acknowledges an act of journalism or the use of
media to make something publicly known.248 Rather than affirm
or recognize freedom of the press, the Court frequently chooses
to merely note that a news story was published or that press
coverage occurred. Perhaps even more troubling for the press,
frames that strongly correlate with negative tonal
depictions—such as the frame Justices use to note that the press
injured an individual’s privacy, reputation, or emotional
well-being—also have comparatively stronger frequency in this
time period.249 Simultaneously, the press-freedom frame is
disappearing. Thus, while infrequency of press references may
partially explain the drop in press-freedom references, this
overall decline does not fully explain this frame’s
disproportionate disappearance.
A second, separate set of data that we gathered similarly
undercuts the proposition that the press-freedom frame’s
disappearance is simply a function of the Court discussing the
press less overall. There is strong evidence that the Court is
neglecting opportunities to reference freedom of the press that
it previously might have used as moments to reaffirm and
246. See supra Figure 2; Table A.
247. See supra Figure 2; Table B.
248. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
249. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 401
(“[A]lthough the Roberts Court does not speak about the press often, when it
does, it says that the press is harmful to people.”).
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acknowledge the right. As discussed above, the ongoing vitality
of freedom of the press as a baseline concept was not solely
fueled by references in cases with press-focused fact patterns
but also in judicial opinions not involving the press, which
alluded to it as part of a wider First Amendment discussion.
This invocation of press freedom—essentially as a “traveling
companion” to freedom of speech—once routinely occurred in
more generalized “freedom of expression” cases.250 These
references were, at times, arguably ambiguous in their
substantive meaning but were nonetheless significant for their
preservation of press freedom as a rhetorical and conceptual
constitutional ingredient that could potentially be employed in
future press-focused cases. Justices Black and Douglas, known
for their First Amendment absolutism,251 regularly engaged in
this coupling of the rights by discussing “freedom of speech and
of the press” in a single breath,252 but they certainly were not
alone in the practice.253 Throughout past eras, these “traveling
250. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
251. See Jones & West, Empirical Study, supra note 70, at 414–15.
252. See, e.g., Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Loc. 753 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]his great
responsibility is entrusted to courts . . . that those brought before them may
enjoy a trial in which all their constitutional rights are
safeguarded—including the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
the press.”); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495 (1949)
(“This contention appears to be grounded on the guaranties of freedom of
speech and press stemming from the Fourteenth and First Amendments.”);
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“What
are the ‘more important’ interests for the protection of which constitutional
freedom of speech and press must be given second place?”); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 346 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (“A great purpose of freedom of
speech and press is to provide a forum for settlement of acrimonious disputes
peaceably . . . .”); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947) (“[T]he
unequivocal command of the First Amendment serve[s] as [a] constant
reminder[] that freedom of speech and of the press should not be
impaired . . . .”); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (“When First
Amendment rights are involved, we look even more closely lest . . . freedom of
speech or of the press suffer.” (citation omitted)); Old Dominion Branch No.
496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 290 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court
frequently has rested state free speech and free press decisions on the
Fourteenth Amendment generally rather than on the Due Process Clause
alone.” (internal quotation omitted)).
253. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118 (1872)
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (discussing constitutional rights, including “the right
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companion” references situated speech and press freedoms as
coequal and complementary constitutional rights.
To explore this practice further, we collected an additional
dataset to study the Justices’ practice of jointly mentioning the
freedoms of speech and press as part of its discussions of First
Amendment rights. We gathered data on this practice for two
key time periods—the fifteen years of the Roberts Court (2005
to 2019) and a period a half-century earlier of equivalent,
fifteen-year length (1960 to 1974).254 For both periods, we
investigated every reference to freedom of speech for the
presence of any “traveling companions”—constitutional rights
that were mentioned alongside the speech-freedom right.
Our examination reveals that freedom of the press is no
longer a regular “traveling companion” to freedom of speech.
Figure 12 offers a comparison of the fifteen-year periods. In the

of free speech and a free press”); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194
U.S. 279, 294 (1904) (“We are not to be understood as depreciating the vital
importance of freedom of speech and of the press . . . .”); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925) (“[T]he ‘liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the liberty of speech and of the press . . . .”); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (“[T]his court has considered that freedom of
speech and of the press are rights protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939) (“This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the
press as fundamental personal rights and liberties.” (citation omitted));
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (“The freedom of speech and of
the press guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .”); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 284 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[F]reedom of speech and of
the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining
those who wield power.”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 487 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The great liberties of speech and the press are
curtailed but not denied.”); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 250
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he protection
of freedom of speech and press . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)); Bartnicki
v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (“The risk of this exposure is an essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech
and of press.” (internal quotation omitted)); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534
U.S. 316, 320 (2002) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of ‘the freedom of
speech, or of the press’ prohibits a wide assortment of government restraints
upon expression . . . .” (citation omitted)); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359
(“Furthermore, the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)).
254. See Figure 12.
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period from 1960 to 1974, press freedom was a consistent
traveling companion to freedom of speech. In 37% of all
paragraphs containing a reference to free speech, the Court also
referenced freedom of the press.255 Freedom of speech traveled
alongside freedom of the press far more frequently than it
traveled with any other constitutional right—nearly twice as
often as the next most common right.256 Indeed, during this
period, freedom of speech as a concept was accompanied by
freedom of the press almost as often as it appeared alone.
Figure 12

The data from the fifteen-year period of the Roberts Court
stands in stark contrast. While in the previous period, the Court
delivered hundreds of “traveling companion” paragraphs, the
Roberts Court has done so fewer than two dozen times. During
this more recent era, press freedom was a “traveling companion”
255. This period had 561 total references to freedom of speech. In 208 of
them, there is also a reference to freedom of the press.
256. See Figure 12.
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to free speech only 6% of the time.257 A Court that once routinely
referred to “freedom of speech and of the press” now nearly
always simply refers to “freedom of speech.” Press freedom has
plummeted even among the ranks of those rights that do
occasionally find mention alongside free speech, now eclipsed in
frequency by religious freedoms, freedom of association, and
other non-First Amendment rights.258
The “traveling companion” data thus further signal that the
disappearance of the press-freedom right at the Court is not
merely an outgrowth of a decline in the overall discussion of the
press. Our data show that the Court is passing up opportunities
to reference freedom of the press that it might have seized in the
past. Freedom of speech references accompanied by a deliberate
marker from the Court that free speech was one half of a vibrant
two-right combination kept the concept of freedom of the press
alive in earlier years. As addressed in more detail below, the
Roberts Court has not lacked for opportunities to make these
same “traveling companion references”; indeed, a robust
free-speech docket, with expansionary Speech Clause
protections, has been a hallmark of the era.259 But free speech
as a concept is now traveling alone, and the once persistent
companion concept of press freedom has been mostly
abandoned. Thus, while the decline in overall press references
surely accounts for some of the reduction in freedom of the press
mentions, the Court’s patterns of referring to press freedom in
non-press contexts has also dramatically shifted, spurring a
more expansive disappearance.
2.

Reduction in Number of Press-Specific Cases

A related, but distinct, explanation for the recent decline in
references to the constitutional right of press freedom could be
a decrease in press-specific cases at the Court.260 Whether seen
257. This period had 381 total references to freedom of speech. Only
twenty-three of them also reference freedom of the press.
258. See Figure 12.
259. For a discussion of the Roberts Court’s approach to First Amendment
speech rights, see Part V.
260. As discussed in Part III, discerning the constitutional status of press
freedom can be a murkier undertaking compared to other provisions. The
Court often speaks in ambiguous language that makes it unclear which rights
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as part of the natural ebb and flow of the Court’s docket or a
predictable aftermath to the press-active caseload of the prior
decades, this argument suggests that the Court simply no longer
considers as many press issues as it once did, and therefore the
Justices have fewer opportunities to discuss the right of press
freedom. On closer review, however, it appears that while the
makeup of the Court’s dockets might explain some of the shift
in press right references, it does not account for the full extent
of the decline.
As discussed earlier, there is a strong consensus among
press scholars that the height of the press’s successes at the
Supreme Court occurred during the latter half of the twentieth
century—particularly during the thirty-year period beginning
in the mid-1960s.261 There is likewise widespread agreement
that the Court today has not been deciding as many cases of key
significance to the press, likely for a variety of interrelated
reasons. The freefalling economics suffered by the news
industry have left the institutional press with fewer resources
to fight legal battles.262 Concentrated media ownership has
reduced competition among the press and resulted in less
boundary-pushing journalism.263 News organizations also might
and protections stem from the Press Clause and which are rooted in the Speech
Clause. There is also uncertainty concerning the Court’s recognition of
differences between members of the “press” and non-press speakers.
Additionally, it has a practice of extending rights that are recognized primarily
because of the press function to everyone. As a result, it is difficult to identify
what factors distinguish a “press case” from other cases, including other First
Amendment cases. Must a member of the press be a party to the case? Must
the Court’s holding rest solely or explicitly on press freedom? Must the case
center on an activity or function of particular value to the press or that is
clearly distinct from speech, such as newsgathering?
261. See supra Part III.
262. See Tony Mauro, “We Need to Be Ready to Fight”, REPS. COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, https://perma.cc/M2D4-KZW9 (quoting Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher partner Theodore Boutrous Jr. as stating that “major media
organizations used to be much more willing to spend time and money to fight
major First Amendment battles”).
263. See PEN AM., LOSING THE NEWS: THE DECIMATION OF LOCAL
JOURNALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/4EXZAJGE (PDF) (stating that after news organizations face economic obstacles
“consolidation and cost cutting gut newsrooms, beats remain uncovered, and
corruption goes uninvestigated, the American populace lacks vital information
about their lives and their communities”).
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be foregoing potential legal challenges out of concern that they
will face press-unfriendly judges.264
Another possible explanation for the reduction in the
number of press-related cases at the Court is that there are
simply fewer unresolved press-specific issues following the spate
of cases decided during earlier decades. While the press
certainly secured a number of important rights and protections
during the post-incorporation eras, it seems shortsighted to
suggest that there are no remaining issues related to press
freedom left for the Court to decide.265 As an initial matter, there
are some press-related issues that the Court addressed during
these earlier years but did not fully resolve. The Court, for
example, has yet to clear up the ongoing confusion about either
the existence or contours of a constitutionally protected
reporter’s privilege,266 a First Amendment right to government
information,267 or the right of public college and university
student journalists not to be censored by their schools.268 A

264. See Mauro, supra note 262 (quoting Theodore Boutrous Jr. as saying
that “there is a sense among some that the current court is hostile to freedom
of the press and that it is too risky to ask the court to weigh in on important
issues”).
265. See supra Part I. Moreover, the large number of freedom of speech
cases decided during this period has not stopped the Roberts Court from
continuing to find cases that raise new free speech questions. See infra Part
V.B.3.
266. See Brief Amici Curiae of ABC, Inc. et al., Miller v. United States, 545
U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507, 04-1508), 2005 WL 1199075; Sari Horwitz &
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Refuses to Take Reporter’s Case on Revealing
Confidential Source, WASH. POST (June 2, 2014), https://perma.cc/UU6TW2SW.
267. See Matthew L. Schafer, Does Houchins v. KQED, Inc. Matter? BUFF.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 2) (“The plurality concluded that
‘[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a
right of access to government information.’” (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978))).
268. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988)
(“We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and
university level.”); Brief of Amici Curiae Student Press Law Center et al.,
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F. 3d 731 (2005) (No. 05-377), 2005 WL 2736314, at *3
(“Because of the growing confusion and conflict among the lower courts on [the
question left undecided by Hazelwood School District], amici believe the time
has come for this Court to provide an answer.”).
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review of advocacy groups’ litigation activity in these areas
likewise reveals a host of other unresolved legal questions
affecting the press, such as the risks for journalists and their
sources under the Espionage Act;269 protections against
government surveillance of the press;270 the targeting and arrest
of journalists by law enforcement;271 government censorship on
digital platforms;272 restrictions on the ability of government
employees to talk to the press or to share certain information
publicly;273 the unsealing of court records;274 the right to record
law enforcement officials;275 and warrantless searches of
electronic devices at the border.276
269. See Jameel Jaffer, The Espionage Act and a Growing Threat to Press
Freedom, THE NEW YORKER (June 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/6Z2T-AC7U.
270. See, e.g., Mailyn Fidler, Police Camera Surveillance Threatens First
Amendment Interests, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (Feb. 22, 2021),
https://perma.cc/GN5G-YPYX. See generally, e.g., Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l
Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., 14 F.4th 276 (4th Cir. 2021).
271. See, e.g., Elahe Izadi, Iowa Reporter Acquitted in a Trial that Shocked
Press Freedom Advocates, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2021, 3:24 PM),
https://perma.cc/55A2-Q4E4; Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, 338 F.R.D. 109,
114 (D. Minn. 2021) (granting a restraining order against Minnesota police to
prevent continued “violat[ions] [of] the constitutional rights of the members of
the press who are covering [the George Floyd] protests”).
272. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Can’t Block Critics From His Twitter
Account,
Appeals
Court Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (July
9, 2019),
https://perma.cc/EGE8-YSEX.
273. See, e.g., Edgar v. Haines, 2 F.4th 298, 304–07 (4th Cir. 2021)
(addressing “prepublication review” requirements of intelligence agency
employees and military personnel); Cato Inst. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 4 F.4th
91, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (addressing gag orders of public officials).
274. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, https://perma.cc/8RGQ-ZRPN (last updated Apr. 19, 2021)
(addressing arguments that newspapers “have a First Amendment and
common law right to access the records, and that the potential harm in
unsealing the court documents does not outweigh the public’s interest in
accessing them”).
275. See, e.g., Project Veritas Action Fund v. Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 817 (1st
Cir. 2020) (detailing a Massachusetts law prohibiting recording).
276. See, e.g., Alasaad v. Mayorkas, 988 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2021)
(addressing policies that “allow border agents to perform ‘basic’ searches of
electronic devices without reasonable suspicion and ‘advanced’ searches only
with reasonable suspicion.”); Seth Harp, I’m a Journalist But I Didn’t Fully
Realize the Terrible Power of U.S. Border Officials Until They Violated My
Rights and Privacy, THE INTERCEPT (June 22, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/PV3C-GUUC.
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Even accepting that there has been a decrease in the
number of press-related cases at the Court, the question
remains whether a smaller press docket fully accounts for the
decrease in references to press freedom. Or, alternatively, are
today’s Justices overlooking opportunities in the cases they are
deciding to mention the right that past Justices likely would
have embraced?
As discussed above, our baseline analysis of expected
references suggests that the Roberts Court Justices have been
sharply underperforming their predecessors when it comes to
press freedom references.277 Notably, in establishing those
baseline era trends, we relied on the Supreme Court Database’s
“issue area” coding, which categorizes every case the Court
decides as involving one of fourteen broad legal areas.278 One of
these issue areas identifies all of the Court’s “First Amendment”
cases.279 By relying on the average number of expected
references per case by issue area, we were able to adjust for any
shift in the types of cases the Court was considering, including
a potential drop in the number of First Amendment cases.
To consider these questions further, we sought to identify
potentially viable opportunities for more recent Justices to
acknowledge the constitutional right of press freedom. We
examined cases where news organizations and press advocates
filed amicus briefs highlighting potential press freedom issues
despite members of the press not being parties to the
proceedings.280 Our analysis revealed that the Roberts Court
frequently omitted references to press freedom in their opinions,
regardless of press organizations’ attempts to highlight the
impact of issues on the free press and how these cases fit under
the press freedom framework. This was the case, moreover, even
in cases with some similarity to earlier cases in which these

277. See supra Part IV.
278. See The Supreme Court Database: Online Code Book, WASH. UNIV. L.,
https://perma.cc/XS6B-D6WJ.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 132714, at *3 [hereinafter Brief of the Reporters
Committee].
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Justices’ predecessors had acknowledged the constitutional
right of press freedom.
In the Court’s 2010 decision of Citizens United v. FEC,281 for
example, the Roberts Court considered whether a campaign
finance law regulating the distribution of a political
documentary violated the First Amendment.282 The Court heard
oral argument in the case twice.283 Before the first argument,
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, a press
advocacy organization, filed an amicus brief emphasizing the
value of the work of the news media and situating the issues
within a press freedom framework.284 The brief contended that
the law raised potential risks for the “free press” and that it
violated the “freedom of speech and of the press.”285 Less than a
year later, before re-argument of the case, the Reporters
Committee filed another brief again stressing the constitutional
press freedom issues at stake.286 It specifically asked the Court
to clarify the relationship between some of its past decisions and
“the First Amendment’s protection of the press.”287 In response,
another group of news organizations filed an amici brief that
argued the opposite—that the campaign finance provision
sufficiently protected the First Amendment rights of
journalists.288 Indeed, at least four other briefs filed by various
groups in this case discussed the issues, at least in part, on press
freedom grounds.289 These groups did not agree on the specific
281. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
282. Id. at 318–19.
283. Id. at 385 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
284. See generally Brief of the Reporters Committee, supra note 280.
285. Id. at *5, *12.
286. See generally Supplemental Brief for The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2219299.
287. Id. at *2.
288. See Supplemental Brief for The Center for Independent Media et al.
as Amici Curiae in Supporting Appellee, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365229, at *4–6.
289. See generally Brief on Supplemental Question for The Institute for
Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365219; Brief on Supplemental
Question for The Free Speech Defense and Education Fund, Inc. et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No.
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issues in the case or on the meaning of press freedom;
nonetheless, they all acknowledged press freedom’s relevancy in
the case, even if only as a “traveling companion.” Yet, the
majority decision in Citizens United contains no reference to the
constitutional right to freedom of the press and instead grounds
its discussion solely in the freedom of speech.290
A sampling of other cases shows a similar pattern: In the
2017 case of Packingham v. North Carolina,291 the Court
reviewed a state law prohibiting sex offenders from accessing
certain social media websites.292 Press advocates told the Court
in amici briefs that the case presented issues that affected the
First Amendment rights “of speech and press” and “the press’s
First Amendment right to distribute news.”293 Yet the
Packingham Court did not once mention the word “press” and
instead focused its entire discussion on “the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause.”294 Likewise, in the 2018 case of Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach,295 the Court was asked to determine
whether a man was constitutionally arrested after he spoke
critically of government officials at a city council meeting.296

08-205), 2009 WL 2372918; Brief for The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No.
08-205), 2009 WL 106650; Brief for The Foundation for Free Expression as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 97752.
290. See generally Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. Justice Antonin Scalia’s
concurrence and Justice John Paul Stevens’s dissent, however, do mention and
debate the right of press freedom. See id. at 390 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at
420 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Michael
W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123
YALE L.J. 412, 416 (2013) (“[T]he most important flaw—a flaw to which the
parties and the lower courts contributed—was to analyze the case under the
wrong clause of the First Amendment.”).
291. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
292. See id. at 1733.
293. Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and The
Thomas Jefferson Center for Protection of Free Expression as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)
(No. 15-1194), 2016 WL 7438450, at *8–9 (“[I]ndividuals have the
constitutional right to listen to what others have to say”).
294. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1733.
295. 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018).
296. See id. at 1948–49.
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Briefs by multiple amici and one of the parties debated how the
case interacted with the constitutional right to press freedom.297
The Court’s opinion, however, again contains no press right
references. As a final example, in Carpenter v. United States,298
twenty press amici explicitly told the Court that it should
consider the Fourth Amendment’s historic role in protecting
“the freedom of the press” as part of its decision regarding
whether law enforcement officials could obtain cellphone
location site information without a warrant.299 Although the
Justices were deeply divided on the main issues in Carpenter,
they were united in their decision not to mention the
constitutional right to a free press in any of the five published
opinions.
These opinions stand in stark contrast to those from earlier
periods, when Justices frequently referenced press freedom in
cases where news media organizations were not parties—and
sometimes in cases that did not even involve a First Amendment
issue at all. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,300 for example, the
Court considered regulations on the exhibition and distribution
of motion pictures—an issue similar to that underlying Citizens
United.301 Like Citizens United, Burstyn did not have a news

297. See, e.g., Brief for Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project and
Brechner Center for Freedom of Information as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21),
2017 WL 6804623, at *6 (“[T]his case raises First Amendment free press
concerns, not simply free speech and petition interests.”); Brief for National
Press Photographers Association and 25 Media and Free Speech
Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018) (No. 17-21), 2017 WL 6804624, at *6
(arguing that “freedom of the press is at risk”).
298. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
299. Brief for The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 19
Media Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402), 2017 WL 3530966, at *14.
300. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
301. Compare id. at 497 (“The issue here is the constitutionality, under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, of a New York statute which permits the
banning of motion picture films on the ground that they are ‘sacrilegious.’”),
with Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 321 (2010) (“[Citizens United]
feared . . . that [its] film . . . would be covered by § 441b’s ban on
corporate-funded independent expenditures, thus subjecting the corporation
to civil and criminal penalties.”).
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media organization as a party; yet, unlike the Citizens United
Court, the Burstyn Court repeatedly referenced the
constitutional freedom of the press.302
The Roberts Court’s Packingham decision, meanwhile, is
comparable to the 1940 case of Thornhill v. Alabama,303 where
the Court considered the arrest of two union workers for
“loitering and picketing” outside of a wood-processing plant
during a labor strike.304 Neither Thornhill nor Packingham
involves a news media party, although they both implicate
questions about the government’s use of criminal law to target
disfavored speakers and prevent them from potentially reaching
certain audiences. Unlike the Packingham Court, however, the
Court in Thornhill referenced press freedom multiple times.305
The examples continue. In the 1960 case of Wilkinson v.
United States,306 the Court addressed a situation which echoed
the issue in Lozman. In Wilkinson, the petitioner was criminally
convicted after he refused to answer questions before the House
Committee on Un-American Activities and publicly disputed the
legality of the Congressional investigation into his possible
affiliations with the Communist Party.307 Thus, in both
Wilkinson and Lozman, the Justices were tasked with
considering the constitutional implications of government
officials wielding criminal charges against speakers who
publicly challenge them. Unlike Lozman, however, the
Wilkinson opinion repeatedly references press freedom.308

302. See, e.g., Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502 (“[E]xpression by means of motion
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.”); id. at 503 (“[T]he basic principles of freedom
of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary.”).
303. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
304. Id. at 91.
305. See id. at 95 (“The freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among
the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons
by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. (“Abridgment of
freedom of speech and of the press . . . impairs those opportunities for public
education that are essential to effective exercise of the power of correcting
error through . . . popular government.”).
306. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
307. See id. at 400–04.
308. See, e.g., id. 422–23 (Black, J., dissenting) (“For the principles of the
First Amendment are stated in precise and mandatory terms and unless they
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Finally, a 1961 case, Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property
at 104 East Tenth Street,309 can be juxtaposed against Carpenter
in that both cases examined the Fourth Amendment limitations
on government searches against non-press actors.310 The
Marcus Court, however, did precisely what the Roberts Court
did not do in Carpenter (despite the press advocates’
requests)—it acknowledged the historical relationship between
Fourth Amendment protections and the freedom of the press.
Writing for the Court, Justice William Brennan stated that
“[h]istorically the struggle for freedom of speech and press in
England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the search
and seizure power.”311
The argument that the Roberts Court has not had the same
opportunities to mention the constitutional right to press
freedom does not fully account for the reduction in its references.
Rather, review of the cases suggests that the Justices from prior
eras had press freedom more front of mind and included
references to the right more naturally in a variety of contexts.
In contrast, despite press advocates’ efforts to draw attention to
threats to the right, recent Justices have developed a habit of
omitting mentions to press freedom.
3.

Press Freedom and the Roberts Court’s First Amendment

The suggestion that the Roberts Court’s failure to mention
the constitutional right of press freedom is due to a dearth in
opportunities rings all the more hollow in light of the Roberts

are applied in those terms, the freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly
and petition will have no effective protection.”); id. at 425–26 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“Criticism of government finds sanctuary in several portions of
the First Amendment. It is part of the right free speech. It embraces freedom
of the press.”).
309. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
310. Compare id. at 718 (“This appeal presents the question whether due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment was denied . . . by the
application . . . of Missouri’s procedures authorizing the search for and seizure
of allegedly obscene publications preliminarily to their destruction . . . .), with
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (“This case presents
the question whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth
Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records . . . .”).
311. Id. 724.
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Court’s reputation as a Court with an active—and at times
groundbreaking—interest in First Amendment rights.
Setting aside any debates about the correctness of its
rulings, the Roberts Court can hardly be accused of overlooking
issues of expressive freedoms. In fact, according to a study by
Ronald Collins and David Hudson, the Court decided fifty-six
free speech cases between 2005 and 2020.312 Time and again, the
Roberts Court has upheld or seriously entertained novel or
boundary-pushing First Amendment arguments, and they did
so in cases where, in the eyes of many observers, the connection
between the underlying activities and traditional free speech
values were more tangential than in the past. The Court, for
example, considered free speech issues in cases involving animal
snuff films,313 offensive or disparaging trademarks,314 credit
card fees,315 union dues,316 vanity license plates,317 student
athlete recruitment,318 commercial disclosure of doctors’

312. Ronald Collins & David Hudson, John Roberts: Mr. First Amendment,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 21, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/9SKH-AYZG.
313. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (holding that
an animal cruelty statute was substantially overbroad and therefore invalid
under the First Amendment).
314. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (finding that the
Lanham Act’s disparagement clause “violates the Free Speech Clause”); Iancu
v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2019) (determining that the Lanham Act’s
bar for “immoral or scandalous” phrases discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint and therefore violated the First Amendment).
315. See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151
(2017) (remanding the case for consideration of whether a New York statute
prohibiting merchants from requiring customers to pay a credit card surcharge
regulated speech).
316. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (holding that, under the First Amendment,
“[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted
from a nonmember’s wages . . . unless the employee affirmatively consents to
pay.”).
317. See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S.
200, 219–20 (2015) (holding that Texas did not violate free speech rights by
refusing a license-plate design displaying the Confederate flag).
318. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S.
291, 299 (2007) (finding that a state actor’s anti-recruiting rule did not violate
a school’s First Amendment rights when the school voluntarily joined the
organization).
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drug-prescribing records,319 bigoted protests near military
funerals,320 and the sale of violent video games to minors
without parental consent.321
Even in cases considering potential free speech issues that
were more similar to those of prior eras, the Roberts Court
Justices still often surprised commentators by handing down
rulings that took a more expansive speech-protective stance
than expected.322 They declared, for example, that corporations
have equivalent rights to people323 and that states cannot create
protective zones around women entering abortion clinics.324
They held that the government cannot punish people who lie
about winning military honors,325 impose “entirely reasonable”

319. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579–80 (2011) (“The
capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including
records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved
issues . . . . In considering how to protect those interests, however, the State
cannot engage in content-based discrimination to advance its own side of a
debate.”).
320. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (“As a Nation we have
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to
ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”).
321. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011)
(“[California’s legislation] abridges the First Amendment rights of young
people whose parents (and aunts and uncles) think violent video games are a
harmless pastime.”).
322. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice Roberts
Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision, THE NEW YORKER (May 14, 2012),
https://perma.cc/28KU-JU5M (“[Citizens United’s counsel] could tell from the
new Questions Presented that the Court was . . . heading for a ruling that was
far broader than the one he had originally sought.”)
323. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
324. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 494–97 (2014); see also Emily
Jane Goodman, Supreme Court Decision on Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones
Opens the Door to Further Challenges, THE NATION (July 1, 2014),
https://perma.cc/CAR4-C5TP.
325. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012) (finding that
the power that the Stolen Valor Act potentially gave government created a
chill that the “First Amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and
discourse are to remain a foundation of our freedom”); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA
J. (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:57 PM), https://perma.cc/8W5H-YVAT (“Alvarez is one of
the court’s most emphatic statements that false speech is generally protected
by the First Amendment and it is for the marketplace of ideas, and not for the
government, to decide what is true and what is false.”); id. (“What makes
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regulations on local signage,326 or require reproductive
healthcare clinics to display factual information.327
In light of this record, both supporters and critics of the
Roberts Court agree on at least this much: the Court “has
dramatically expanded the reach of the First Amendment by
striking down a wide range of statutes for encroaching on free
speech rights.”328 Floyd Abrams, for example, said the Roberts
Court “deserves great credit” for its record “render[ing] First
Amendment-protective decisions in an extraordinarily broad
range of cases,” while Geoffrey Stone stated that “[t]he Roberts
court has given more protection to free speech across a larger
range of areas than any of its predecessors have—although
sometimes unwisely.”329 After noting in a review of the Court’s
2010 Term that the “[f]ree-speech claimants won virtually every
case, even the close and difficult ones,” Michael McConnell
concluded that free speech jurisprudence “must be seen as this
Court’s most distinctive contribution to the ongoing judicial
interpretation of our constitutional order.”330
Alvarez surprising is that the Roberts court had generally rejected free speech
claims when the institutional interests of the government were at stake.”).
326. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (holding that a law
prohibiting certain types of signage failed strict scrutiny and violated free
speech guarantees).
327. See Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378
(2018) (deciding that a California law requiring pro-life reproductive facilities
to notify patients of certain services, including abortions, violated the First
Amendment); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional
Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
61, 66 (2019) (“NIFLA v. Becerra is only secondarily about speech. . . . The
Court ignored legal precedent, failed to weigh the interests at stake in its
decision, and applied a more demanding standard based on content of
speech.”).
328. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Chief Justice Roberts Is Reshaping the
First Amendment, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:58 AM),
https://perma.cc/72C5-BREN.
329. Steve Chapman, The John Roberts Court: Champion of Free Speech,
CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2017, 2:48 PM), https://perma.cc/9MSG-KNVU.
330. Michael W. McConnell, A Free Speech Year at the Court, FIRST THINGS
(Oct. 2011), https://perma.cc/N6W9-G3EV; see also Ronald K.L. Collins,
Foreword: Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First Amendment,
and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 413 (2012) (“[T]here
is . . . something remarkable in how the Roberts Court has re-conceptualized
the way we think about certain free speech issues and has likewise
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If press freedom relies on Justices who notice, appreciate,
and acknowledge underlying expressive values, then it would be
natural to assume that a Court that is known for its purportedly
broad protection of First Amendment values would also fully
embrace press freedom. Yet our data reveal that this is not the
case. As expansive as it might be in some ways, the Roberts
Court’s particular vision of the First Amendment is not one that
prioritizes the constitutional protection of the free press.
The growing chorus of scholars critical of the Roberts
Court’s free speech jurisprudence will likely be unsurprised by
the revelation that the Court has left certain types of speech
outside the ambit of its much-celebrated free speech
expansionism. Over the past decade, an increasing number of
academics and commentators have argued that the Court’s
approach primarily favors only particular speakers or messages,
while leaving others with far less vibrant protections.331 When
assessing the Justices’ First Amendment decisions, Heidi
Kitrosser has explained that the calculus is “not a mere matter
of tallying free speech wins and losses,” but also requires
acknowledging “the importance of the speech that they fail to
protect.”332
The Roberts Court, for example, has actively defended the
rights of corporate and commercial speakers,333 but it has
allowed the government to regulate, at times severely, the

reinvigorated a measure of free speech liberty, albeit to the consternation of
many.”).
331. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, supra note 145, at
725 (“The pattern is uniform and troubling: when the government is
functioning as an authoritarian institution, freedom of speech always loses.”).
332. Heidi Kitrosser, Public Employee Speech and Magarian’s Dynamic
Diversity, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2018).
333. See Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2118 (2018) (“These days, the winners
in First Amendment cases are much more likely to be corporations and other
economically and politically powerful actors.” (citation omitted)); see also Tim
Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First
Amendment, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), https://perma.cc/AQ35-2XSL
(“Once the patron saint of protestors and the disenfranchised, the First
Amendment has become the darling of economic libertarians and corporate
lawyers who have recognized its power to immunize private enterprise from
legal restraint.”).
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speech of students,334 unions,335 prisoners,336 and government
workers.337 Gregory Magarian refers to the Court’s selective
record on expressive liberties as a preference for “managed
speech,” which he describes as a First Amendment
jurisprudence that “concentrates managerial power over public
discussion in the government or in favored private actors.”338
Kathleen Sullivan depicts this record as “a triumph of the
libertarian over the egalitarian vision of free speech.”339 In other
words, Sullivan asserts that the Court has endorsed a view that
“treats with skepticism all government efforts at speech
suppression that might skew the private ordering of ideas,” as
opposed to one centered on the protection of “marginal,
dissident, or unpopular viewpoints that are likely to suffer
political subordination or hostility.”340 Other scholars contend
that the Court’s free expression jurisprudence is most aptly
labeled “First Amendment Lochnerism”—the process through
which the Court has transformed expressive rights from

334. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (“The First
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events student
expression that contributes to [the dangers of illegal drug use].”).
335. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018).
336. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 533 (2006) (determining that a
prison’s policy depriving dangerous inmates of access to newspapers,
magazines and photos was constitutional).
337. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.”).
338. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S
FIRST AMENDMENT xv (2017)
The Roberts Court, with a consistency and potency unique in the
Supreme Court’s history, has authorized established, powerful
institutions strongly invested in the status quo to exercise
managerial control over public discussion, with the apparent goal
and typical result of pushing public discussion away from
destabilizing, noisy margins and toward a stable, settled center.
339. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 143, 145 (2010).
340. Id. at 145, 148.
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“weapons of the weak into one more resource that wealthy
interests could deploy to preserve their advantages.”341
The constitutional value of press freedom is, of course,
different in significant ways from the disfavored speech
described by these scholars. While historically freedom of the
press has been critically important as a protection for some
unpopular and disfavored voices, the free press does not
exclusively consist of inherently marginalized voices, nor does it
always embody unpopular viewpoints. In fact, the institutional
press can be a uniquely powerful speaker in many contexts. Yet
the free press in all of its forms shares important qualities with
these other disfavored categories that likewise make its steady
disappearance from the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
canon highly concerning. By design, the press functions as a
counterbalance to the government and thus threatens the
“managerial power” of government actors defined by
Magarian,342 thereby making members of the press more likely
to be targets of the government hostility described by
Sullivan.343 And while the American press is not necessarily
weak (the trait identified by the scholars of First Amendment
Lochnerism), it functions to equalize the balance of power
between the people and their government through government
scrutiny and the dissemination of information of public
concern.344
Thus, whatever the appropriate description of the Roberts
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence may be, our study
contributes an important additional observation: this
jurisprudence does not include any meaningful conception of
freedom of the press. In contrast to their purportedly open
embrace of freedom of speech—which expanded the concept to
new speakers and new activities, while rejecting many limits or
341. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Introduction: The Search for an
Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1960 (2018). See
generally Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133 (2016);
Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016).
342. See generally MAGARIAN, supra note 338.
343. See generally Sullivan, supra note 339.
344. See Sonja R. West, The Majoritarian Press Clause, 2020 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 311, 314 (2020) (asserting that one of the Press Clause’s tasks is
“safeguarding our collective, majoritarian right to a republican form of
government”).
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regulations—the Roberts Court has rejected the freedom of the
press. Rather than mirror their inclusive and, at times,
near-absolutist stance regarding freedom of speech, the Justices
have starved the press-freedom right of oxygen by seemingly
erasing it from its prior platform of rhetorical prominence.
CONCLUSION
Freedom of the press—a principle once roundly recognized
by Justices of all stripes at the U.S. Supreme Court—is
disappearing. On every meaningful measure captured by our
dataset, the frequency of acknowledgement of the right is in
sharp decline. No Justices on the current Court invoke the
concept with any regularity, and a contextual review of their
rare passing references suggests there are no remaining
advocates of the right. Missing from the current Court’s lexicon
are not only the glowing positive endorsements of a free press as
vital, valuable, or crucial to democracy, but also the bare,
passing references to the concept that once appeared with great
frequency. Although the social, judicial, and technological
factors that have combined to bring about this change are surely
complex, our data rule out that the desertion of the concept is
solely a result of the Court’s shifting ideology. They also cast
serious doubt on the notion that the issue is simply the result of
a decrease in references to the press more generally, a reduction
in the Court’s press-focused docket, or other lack of opportunity
to refer to freedom of the press. Indeed, the evidence is entirely
to the contrary. The Roberts Court has built a reputation of
actively and expansively engaging cases that speak to principles
of First Amendment expressive freedom—the very sorts of cases
that our data show would unquestionably have given rise to a
reference to press freedom a generation ago. A Court that is
otherwise capacious in its First Amendment acknowledgements
has all but deleted a major First Amendment value from the
conversation.
The institutional press itself is changing—and may even be
disappearing—but the press and the press function of course
continue to exist, and a stable democracy requires continued
recognition of the overarching principle of press freedom.
Indeed, a powerful academic movement at this moment has
turned its attention to the invigoration of the Press Clause
precisely because scholars and commentators recognize the
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critical value of protecting these functions in a new media
landscape.
The lesson from our data is that this movement needs a
more fundamental starting point. Conversations about the scope
and contours of the freedom of the press should be shaped by a
recognition that the current Court’s rhetorical and conceptual
acknowledgement of the freedom is disappearing.

